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ABSTRACT 
There is an apparent disagreement between recent commentators who find in Nietzsche 
both a constructive philosophy and a compatibilist account of freedom, and Brian Leiter’s 
reading that rejects both.  The reason for this disagreement, I argue, is that Leiter’s “illiberal” 
view is limited in scope to Nietzsche’s critical philosophy, while Nietzsche also has a 
constructive philosophy aimed at select readers.  I read Nietzsche’s critical philosophy as 
targeting the metaphysical entities that underpin asceticism and herd values, not the mental states 
and processes with which these entities are associated.  The “no such entity” reading preserves 
the resources needed to read Nietzsche as offering a replacement for the ascetic ideal—and an 
alternative source for life’s meaning.  Although few of his readers will have been born with the 
drives needed to throw off herd values and enjoy compatibilist freedom, these readers are the 
intended audience for Nietzsche’s constructive philosophy.   
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1 
1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Introduction  
 In GM II 2 Nietzsche presents a brief overview of the moral history of humanity.
1
  He 
describes the long period of the “morality of custom” as the “long history of the origins of 
responsibility.”  Only through the “morality of custom” was man made “necessary, uniform, like 
among like, regular, and accordingly predictable”—“truly calculable” (GM II 2).  Nietzsche then 
states, with dramatic effect, that the “ripest” and “late fruit” of the tree of nature, produced at the 
end of this very long process, is none other than  
the sovereign individual, the individual resembling only himself, free again from 
the morality of custom, autonomous and supramoral […], in short, the human 
being with his own independent long will, the human being who is permitted to 
promise—and in him a proud consciousness, twitching in all his muscles, of 
what has finally been achieved and become flesh in him, a true consciousness of 
power and freedom, a feeling of the completion of man himself. (GM II 2)    
  
This portrayal of the “sovereign individual” (SI) has been the stimulus for much recent 
work on the themes of freedom and autonomy in Nietzsche.  In a recent collection of essays, 
several commentators argue that the SI plays a significant role in Nietzsche’s thought (Gemes 
and May 2009).  None denies that there is irony in GM II 2 or that Nietzsche rejects the 
traditional reading of “free will” as “freedom to do otherwise.”  In his Introduction to this 
collection, Simon May concludes that all of the contributors agree that “the individual, for 
Nietzsche, is so inextricably embedded in the natural, causal, order, that strong voluntarism can 
have no role in any Nietzschean concept of freedom” (Gemes and May 2009: 20).  They present 
a variety of accounts of freedom and autonomy in Nietzsche, including freedom as an affirmative 
                                                 
1
 I am using the translation of The Genealogy of Morality by Maudemarie Clarke and Alan J. Swenson, Hackett, 
1998.   In referring to Nietzsche’s texts I use the following notation: “GM II 2” refers to the second section of the 
second treatise of The Genealogy of Morality, where “GM” indicates the Genealogy, “II” indicates the second 
treatise of that work, and “2” is the section number of that treatise.  I use the following abbreviations for the other 
Nietzsche texts cited in the thesis as listed in the References:  Anti-Christ (AC), Daybreak (D), Gay Science (GS), 
Beyond Good and Evil (BGE), Ecce Homo (EH), and Twilight of the Idols (TI).    
2 
psychological relation to one’s own deeds and commitments (Pippin 2009: 85), freedom as the 
achievement, via a political model of commanding and obeying, of a hierarchical order of the 
drives (Clark and Dudrick 2009: 58), freedom of will as taking responsibility for one’s actions 
(Gemes 2009: 43), freedom as the evolving ability of our drives to organize themselves into a 
unified organization or “self” (Richardson 2009: 145), and freedom as related to the control over 
one’s drives and affects required to change and increase one’s perspectives (Janaway 2009: 62). 
These commentators argue that Nietzsche allows for a positive and compatibilist kind of 
freedom, i.e., that the SI (and other “Individuals” as I describe them below) does enjoy freedom, 
and that this freedom does not conflict with Nietzsche’s fatalism. 
On the other hand, Leiter offers a “deflationary” reading of the “sovereign individual” 
passage (Leiter 2002: 228).  He argues that the account of the SI in the text quoted above is little 
more than an ironic portrayal of humanity’s having no more to show for this long period of 
“morality of custom” than the ability to make promises, and that any talk of “freedom” and “free 
will” by Nietzsche is “revisionary” and outside “the philosophical tradition” of Kant and Hume.2      
In a 2011 article, Leiter backs away from his reading of the SI passage as merely ironic, 
allowing that Nietzsche might intend his treatment of the SI as a “substantive ideal”—an 
example of a psychological constitution that is desirable, and even admirable, but not attainable 
by ordinary humans (Leiter 2011: 103).
3
  The practical significance of the SI as substantive ideal 
                                                 
2
 With regard to the “philosophical tradition,” Leiter refers to “on the one hand, the broadly Kantian identification of 
freedom with autonomous action, meaning action arising from rational self-legislation or guidance, which grounds 
moral responsibility; and, on the other, the broadly Humean equation of freedom with acting on the basis of 
effective, conscious desires with which we ‘identify’ (in some sense to be specified).  Neither traditional concept of 
freedom or free will is available to or embraced by Nietzsche the fatalist” (Leiter 2011: 102).  Leiter rules out the 
Humean account of freedom because there are no “effective conscious desires” on Leiter’s reading of Nietzsche. I 
will argue that this “broadly Humean equation of freedom” is present in Nietzsche’s constructive philosophy.        
3
 According to Leiter, the “substantive ideal” is first introduced by Poellner (Leiter 2011: 110).  Leiter also refers to 
Rutherford’s (2011) discussion of a Spinozan view of freedom as a “substantive ideal.”  These views are referred to 
by Leiter as “radically revisionary” (2011: n. 3) and as having “little or no resonance with those ideas of freedom 
that are culturally important” (2011: n. 2).       
3 
is therefore limited, and Leiter argues that the texts cited by the commentators referred to above 
do not provide adequate support for their arguments that Nietzsche has a positive account of 
freedom.  As Leiter concludes, these recent articles are just more misguided attempts to portray 
Nietzsche as more “friendly” and less “illiberal”: “for Nietzsche does not believe in freedom or 
responsibility; he does not think we exercise any meaningful control over our lives; he does not 
think that his revisionary sense of ‘freedom’—the ‘long protracted will’ … is in reach of just 
anyone, that anyone could ‘choose’ to have it….” (Leiter 2011: 117).   
This sets the stage for my project.  On one side we have Leiter’s view that there is no 
place for traditional concepts of autonomy or freedom in Nietzsche and that his presentation of 
the SI in GM II is merely ironic, or, at most, a “substantive ideal.”  On the other, we have a 
number of commentators who attribute positive accounts of freedom to Nietzsche, although not 
the robust kind of freedom in which the agent is an “uncaused cause” (causa sui) or exercises 
choice between metaphysically open alternative courses of action.  On what does this 
disagreement principally turn?  What is the nature of these positive or “revisionary” accounts of 
freedom?  I will argue that this freedom is “compatibilist,” i.e., that our actions are caused, but 
that we have some control over the causes of our actions.
4
  This answer suggests that, like most 
philosophers (including Hume), Nietzsche has a constructive philosophy in addition to his 
                                                 
4
 I consider the definitions of “compatibilist” and “incompatibilist” that I employ here to be uncontroversial.  
Briefly, the question is whether (causal) determinism rules out freedom.  Leiter sees Nietzsche as an 
“incompatibilist”: if causal determinism is true, freedom of will is impossible.  “Compatibilists” argue that 
determinism does not rule out free will.  Actually, for some compatibilists (including Hume), determinism is 
necessary for free will and moral responsibility, since without it there would be no way to be sure the agent deserved 
to be praised or blamed, i.e., that she was the cause of her action.  Importantly, as discussed in Chapter 5, Leiter does 
not read Nietzsche as a “classical determinist”; instead Leiter considers Nietzsche to be a “causal essentialist”: that 
“for any individual substance, e.g., a person or some other living organism, that substance has ‘essential’ properties 
that are causally primary with respect to the future history of that substance” (Leiter 2002: 83). 
4 
critical philosophy.
5
  Nietzsche’s views on freedom are not, as Leiter suggests, outside the 
philosophical tradition.   
On Leiter’s reading, Nietzsche seeks to provide an explanation of human morality, 
formulated as Morality in the Pejorative Sense (MPS)
6
, based on a theory of types and psycho-
physical “type-facts” (Leiter 2002: 112).  Leiter characterizes Nietzsche as “a Speculative 
M[ethodological]-Naturalist, that is, a philosopher, like Hume, who wants to “construct theories 
that are ‘modeled’ on the sciences…in that they take over from science the idea that natural 
phenomena have deterministic causes” (Leiter 2002: 5).  Notably, he sees Nietzsche as arguing 
that consciousness is epiphenomenal, that conscious mental states, including affects and feelings, 
have no causal effect.  Leiter defends his “M-Naturalism” reading against the “laundry list” 
account of naturalism offered by Christopher Janaway (Leiter 2013: 576).
7
   
Janaway considers his account of Nietzsche’s naturalism to be a weaker version of the 
“Results Continuity” branch of M-Naturalism, “one that requires simply that explanations in 
philosophy…not be falsifiable by our best science” (Janaway 2007: 37), a view that he sees 
himself sharing with most commentators.  Janaway sees Nietzsche’s naturalism as aimed at the 
elimination of supernatural or metaphysical entities from explanations of human morality:   
[Nietzsche] opposes transcendental metaphysics, whether that of Plato or 
Christianity or Schopenhauer.  He rejects notions of the immaterial soul, the 
absolutely free controlling will, or the self-transparent pure intellect, instead 
                                                 
5
 I am using “constructive” (which I think of in contrast to “critical”) to describe the reading I am advocating, but I 
think “practical” (contrasted with “theoretical”) also applies. 
6
 MPS is Leiter’s account of the morality that is the object of Nietzsche’s critique.  MPS presupposes three 
descriptive claims about human agents (that the will is free, the self is knowable and all people are essentially 
similar) and embraces norms that harm the “highest” men while benefiting the “lowest” (Leiter 2002: 78).  
7
 Leiter distinguishes M-Naturalism from substantive naturalism, where M-Naturalism requires that philosophical 
inquiry should be “continuous with empirical inquiry in the sciences” and substantive naturalism “is either the 
(ontological) view that the only things that exist are natural (or perhaps simply physical things); or the (semantic) 
view that a suitable philosophical analysis of any concept must show it to be amenable to empirical inquiry” (Leiter 
2002: 5).  Leiter further distinguishes two branches of M-Naturalism: “the Results Continuity branch …requires that 
philosophical theories …. be supported by the results of the sciences…Methods Continuity, by contrast, demands 
only that philosophical theories emulate the methods of successful sciences.”  Leiter calls those following the 
Methods Continuity branch of M-Naturalism “speculative M-naturalists” (Leiter 2002: 4).     
5 
emphasizing the body, talking of the animal nature of human beings, and 
attempting to explain numerous phenomena by invoking drives, instincts, and 
affects which he locates in our physical, bodily existence.  (Janaway 2007: 34)  
 
There is a second reason for Janaway’s reading: Nietzsche’s training in philology.  
Nietzsche believed that the grammatical structure of language has significant and unappreciated 
influence on our way of seeing the world.  People commonly talk as if they are taking action, i.e., 
as if they are free to act or not, when in fact they are just reacting to being acted upon, thereby 
confusing the “active” with the “passive.”  “Mankind has in all ages confused the active and the 
passive: it is their everlasting grammatical blunder” (D 120).  People commonly think of 
lightning as separate from its flash, when there is, in reality, only one event—they see a 
subject/object distinction where there is none.  Similarly, popular morality also separates strength 
from expressions of strength, as if the strong were free to express strength—or not.8   As 
Janaway explains: “The notion of a radically free subject of action is needed in order to make 
human beings controllable, answerable, equal, and in particular to describe inaction as a virtue of 
which all are capable and dominant self-assertion as a wrong for which all are culpable” 
(Janaway 2009: 112).  Janaway sees Nietzsche as focused on eliminating the transcendental 
metaphysics of the herd
9
 —including especially such entities as the “ego,” “self,” “soul” and 
                                                 
8
 “For just as common people separate the lightning from its flash and take the latter as a doing, as an effect of a 
subject called lightning, so popular morality also separates strength from expressions of strength as if there were 
behind the strong an indifferent substratum that is free to express strength—or not to.  But there is no such 
substratum; there is no ‘being’ behind the doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is simply fabricated into the 
doing—the doing is everything” (GM I 13). 
9
 The lower types of humanity, or “herd,” are followers, who depend on their society or ancestors for their values 
and self-image.  But not everyone is a member of the herd.  There are a few exceptional humans, most notably 
Napoleon and Goethe, hopefully some of Nietzsche’s readers, and certainly himself, to whom Nietzsche refers at 
different times as “knowers,” “philosophers” or “experimenters.”  I will use “experimenters” to refer to Nietzsche’s 
target audience, those who refuse to accept the values of the herd and are candidates for Nietzsche’s practical 
philosophy.  The members of the higher types are “dominant, authoritative or self-sufficient” (BGE 206) and 
ultimately determine their own values and self-image.   
6 
“will” without which the ascetic ideal would not be possible. 10   I call this the “no such entity” 
reading.  On this reading, Nietzsche’s account of human morality talks about physically 
embodied drives, instincts and affects, instead of underlying metaphysical entities.   
I noted above that Leiter sees Nietzsche as seeking to explain human morality in terms of 
“types” and psychophysical “type-facts” while denying the causal efficacy of conscious mental 
states, including affects and feelings.  Leiter distinguishes “the Humean Nietzsche,” “the 
Nietzsche who aims to explain morality naturalistically,” from the “Therapeutic Nietzsche,” 
“who wants to get select readers to throw off the shackles of morality” (Leiter 2013: 581).  There 
is a role for the affects in Nietzsche’s philosophy, according to Leiter, but that role is limited to 
reacting to features of Nietzsche’s rhetoric, the purpose of which is to disrupt and change the 
feelings and perceptions of those readers who may have the drives of the higher type but falsely 
believe that herd values are in their interest.   
 On the “no such entity” reading, reflective consciousness and the affects are more than 
just instruments or targets of Nietzsche the writer.  I read Nietzsche as having a constructive 
philosophy based on his readers’ affective response to and engagement with the “Therapeutic 
Nietzsche.”  These target readers will have the drives of the higher type of person, but their 
drives will not yet be organized into a unified hierarchy—this is where the “therapy” and 
Nietzsche’s constructive philosophy is required.  Here we have a significant role for the 
“substantive ideal” of freedom referred to by Leiter.  There are text-based reasons to think that 
Nietzsche has a constructive philosophy, and that this constructive philosophy points to a kind of 
                                                 
10
 Nietzsche believed that “the religions that have existed so far […] have played a principal role in keeping [the 
type “man”] on a lower level (BGE 62), and that ascetic morality, and in particular Christianity, has “waged a war” 
against the higher type of person and made the drives and instincts of the higher types “evil,” casting the strongest 
humans as “reprehensible, as ‘depraved’” (AC 5).  By the “ascetic ideal,” Nietzsche means the practice of 
restraining, denying, postponing or otherwise limiting our natural drives.  The ascetic ideal encourages poverty, 
humility and chastity as practices that are considered “good” and aligned with virtue (GM III 8). 
7 
freedom—freedom that is compatibilist.  When Nietzsche encourages his readers to “become 
who we are” and refers to the “creation of tables of what is good that are new and all our own” 
(GS 335), there is clearly the sense that “we” (here he is addressing his target audience) might or 
might not “become who we are” and that whether we realize the full powers that “we” are born 
with depends in some way on “us.”   Elsewhere, Nietzsche talks about “What we are at liberty to 
do” with respect to our drives and character (D 560), including what we can do to control our 
drives (D 109) and to “give style” to our character (D 290).  Again, he is pointing to the fact that 
there are things we are “at liberty” to do, even though what we do will be causally determined by 
our drives. 
Unquestionably, the destruction of the ascetic ideal is one of Nietzsche’s aims.  But there 
are reasons to think that Nietzsche’s philosophical interests extend beyond this critical project.  
As damaging as the ascetic ideal is, Nietzsche emphasizes that it has been the only source of 
meaning for human life and suffering: 
If one disregards the ascetic ideal: man, the animal man, has until now had no 
meaning.  His existence on earth contained no goal; “to what end man at all?”—
was a question without answer; the will for man and earth was lacking […] (GM 
III 28) 
 
If we view Nietzsche’s philosophical project as limited to its critical dimension, success in 
lessening the grip of the ascetic ideal will deprive human life of its only source of meaning.  An 
alternative source for the meaning of human life—a replacement ideal—is needed.   
I argue (1) Nietzsche has the motivation for presenting a constructive philosophy to his 
readers, (2) an alternative reading of his critical program makes available the resources for 
developing this philosophy, and (3) this constructive philosophy points to an alternative to the 
ascetic ideal—a return to one’s “first nature”—that provides a kind of freedom that is compatible 
with Nietzsche’s fatalism.  I argue that it is Nietzsche’s hope that among his target audience are 
8 
some “experimenters,” some potential “Individuals,” who might be able to acquire self-
understanding, throw off herd values and come to enjoy this compatibilist freedom.  In a passage 
unmistakable in its positive spirit, Nietzsche rallies these imagined readers: 
Indeed, at hearing the news that ‘the old god is dead’, we philosophers and ‘free 
spirits’ feel illuminated by a new dawn; our heart overflows with gratitude, 
amazement, forebodings, expectation—finally the horizon seems clear again, 
even if not bright; finally our ships may set out again […]. (GS V 343)   
 
This cheerful text can be seen as arguing for the significance of the individual, the possibility of 
self-understanding, and an account of free will according to which an agent can act freely, even 
if she could not have done something other than what she did.
 11
    
Nietzsche’s constructive philosophy is still “illiberal” on my reading in that it is not 
available to “just anyone,” but it is positive and practical in the sense that, for those select few in 
Nietzsche’s audience (on the alternative, practical, picture that I advocate), Nietzsche does 
believe in freedom and responsibility; he does think they exercise meaningful control over their 
lives; and he does think that the revisionary sense of “freedom” that Leiter talks about—the 
“long protracted will”—is, from a practical standpoint, something that any of his target readers 
could choose to have.  All three are features of the compatibilist freedom that is available to the 
experimenter. 
                                                 
11
  The distinction between accounts of free will based in choice between alternative courses of action (sometimes 
called the “Garden of Forking Paths” model of control (McKenna 2009: 5)) and accounts of free will in which an 
agent plays a special kind of role in the bringing about of her freely-willed action (sometimes called the “source 
model” of control) is established in the free-will literature (McKenna 2009: 7).  The former is often referred to as 
“regulative control” and the latter “guidance control” due to Fischer (1994: 132, 1998: 31).  In this thesis, I argue 
that Nietzsche’s constructive philosophy features compatibilist freedom based on a “source model” of control.  In 
GS 360 Nietzsche can be seen distinguishing the “driving force” of the ship, the current in the sea, from the 
“directing force,” the helmsman.  The driving force is by far the more important, according to Nietzsche, although 
the directing force is commonly seen as having much more control than is actually the case.  This is an ancient error, 
according to Nietzsche: one has mistaken the helmsman for the stream.  “This seems to me to be one of my most 
essential steps forward: I learned to distinguish the cause of acting from the cause of acting in a certain way, in a 
certain direction, with a certain goal.”  Nonetheless, I would argue, the “directing force” is a force, and does have 
causal effect in some cases.   
9 
In Chapter 2, I present the psychology that is the foundation for Nietzsche’s constructive 
philosophy: first the physical—the body and its drives—and then the requisite mental states, both 
conscious and unconscious, and Nietzsche’s account of behavioral and cognitive processes—
acting, attending, understanding and reflecting.  The highlight of this chapter is the account of 
self-understanding as the hierarchical organization of the drives achieved by the experimenter 
through her actions over time—the psychological basis of the substantive ideal referred to by 
Leiter as one possible reading of the SI.  In Chapter 3, I show how the “no such entity” reading 
enables me to agree with Leiter’s reading of Nietzsche’s critical philosophy (aimed at the herd 
and MPS), while leaving associated mental processes available for developing his constructive 
philosophy aimed at attaining self-understanding.  In Chapter 4, I compare the practical life of 
members of the herd to that of Nietzsche’s target audience to illustrate how an experimenter can 
achieve the hierarchy of her drives, highlighting the freedom available to those experimenters 
who succeed in acquiring self-understanding.  In Chapter 5, I argue that the experimenter, while 
not enjoying the freedom associated with alternative courses of action, does enjoy a kind of 
“source model” of control over her actions in virtue of having achieved an organization, unity, or 
hierarchy of her drives, i.e., that Nietzsche is a compatibilist.  In Chapter 6, I reassess the 
significance of the Sovereign Individual. 
2     NIETZSCHE’S PSYCHOLOGY 
 This chapter presents my understanding of Nietzsche’s psychology—the components of 
Nietzsche’s constructive philosophy.  In the first section, I describe Nietzsche’s account of the 
human being as a collection of embodied physiological drives in a physical environment; in the 
second, I describe Nietzsche’s account of mental states, both conscious and unconscious; and in 
the third, I describe Nietzsche’s account of psychological processes, both behavioral and 
10 
cognitive.  Here I introduce my account of self-understanding as the hierarchical organization of 
the drives that is the basis for the discussion in later chapters of the Individual and compatibilist 
freedom.   
2.1 The Physical:  Bodies, Drives and the External World 
Nietzsche, who referred to himself as “a psychologist without equal” (EH ‘Books’ 5), 
subscribed to a psychology the fundamental components of which are “drives.”  Nietzsche saw 
the self as nothing more than “how one’s innermost drives stand with respect to each other” 
(BGE 6), willing as the power relations of commanding and obeying that goes on in the society 
of one’s drives (BGE 19), understanding as relating to the behavior of one’s drives toward one 
another (GS 333), and knowledge as a certain stability in the organization of the drives (GS 11).  
Given the role of drives as the foundation of Nietzsche’s psychology, a brief discussion of them 
is necessary for elucidating his views on the self, self-understanding, and freedom. 
We risk misunderstanding Nietzsche’s overall picture of humanity if we do not recognize 
that drives are physiological, not supernatural or metaphysical.  Nietzsche was greatly influenced 
by Schopenhauer, according to whom, “[w]anting, striving, trying are to be seen as things that 
we do with our bodies, not as events that occur in detachment from our bodies” (Janaway 1994: 
28), for whom “[a]cts of will are movements of the body caused by conscious representations of 
the world” (Janaway 1994: 36).  Nietzsche wondered if “on a grand scale, philosophy has been 
no more than an interpretation of the body and a misunderstanding of the body” and whether 
“[a]ll those bold lunacies of metaphysics, especially those questions about the value of existence, 
may always be considered, first of all, as symptoms of certain bodies…” (GS Preface 2).   
Paul Katsafanas provides a detailed discussion of Nietzsche’s drive psychology.  He 
appeals to the Oxford English Dictionary, which defines a “drive” as “any internal mechanism 
11 
which sets an organism moving or sustains its activity in a certain direction, or causes it to 
pursue a certain satisfaction… esp. one of the recognized physiological tensions or conditions of 
need, such as hunger or thirst” (Katsafanas 2013: 727).  “Drives” include what we usually refer 
to as “instincts,” as well as desires, wants and needs that are of a constant or recurring 
physiological nature—such as hunger.  It is helpful to think of drives as closely related to 
instincts, since the drives we are born with are the drives we have today: our power to change 
them is limited.  On my understanding of Nietzsche’s psychology, the self is a distinct collection 
of embodied drives that are manifested or expressed by mental states, operating in physical and 
social environments of objects and values.  
Katsafanas notes that Nietzsche sometimes speaks of drives as if they possess the 
characteristics of an agent, i.e., as adopting perspectives, interpreting, evaluating, jockeying for 
power, etc.  He attributes a dispositional account of drives to Nietzsche (Katsafanas 2013: 734).
12
  
A drive has its own intensity or power, but once “triggered” by an object in the environment, it 
manifests (expresses) itself in mental states that are felt by the subject, who then takes a 
perspective on or affective orientation toward that object.  Our drives are strengthened or 
weakened by their interactions with objects that they encounter through the mediation of these 
mental states (D 119).  Exactly how our drives gain strength from these interactions, according to 
what Nietzsche calls their “laws of nutriment,” is unknown to us, and whether or not they are 
strengthened is subject to these physical interactions with our environment.  On Katsafanas’ 
account, “[d]rives manifest themselves by coloring our view of the world, by generating 
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 A standard account of dispositions would talk of how a disposition is manifested, the conditions required for 
manifestation, and, on many accounts, the presence of an intrinsic property or “causal law” on which the disposition 
is based.  For example, we would expect a dispositional account of bravery to say that it manifests itself when a 
person instantly jumps into the water to save a child being pulled out to sea.  Here being faced with the child in 
danger is the condition required for the drive to be manifested.  Our heroine could be brave, but not know it herself, 
if she were never faced with a situation requiring her action.      
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perceptual saliences, by influencing our emotions and other attitudes, by fostering desires,” i.e., 
by influencing how we experience the world in ways we don’t understand (Katsafanas 2013: 
744).   
Katsafanas’ account of Nietzsche’s psychology focuses on drives, but he points to the 
important role of the body in unifying the mental life of the individual human:     
[W]e can deny that drives, considered in isolation, can reason, evaluate, interpret, 
while maintaining that embodied drives—drives considered as part of a whole 
organism—can reason, evaluate, and interpret.  Suppose we accept Nietzsche’s 
claim that our views of the world are selective, emphasizing certain features at the 
expense of others, presenting objects as oriented toward ends of ours, presenting 
situations in affectively charged ways.  This selective, affectively charged 
orientation can be understood as an evaluative orientation.  (Katsafanas 2013: 
744)      
 
Only through a body can the drives be seen to manifest themselves in the world through affects, 
needs and desires.  Only from within a body can the drives interact with physical objects and 
other bodies, compete with each other, and exercise their power by organizing into a hierarchy.  
Nietzsche illustrates the role of the body in interacting with our physical environment by 
emphasizing the effect of nutrition, location, and climate on his own physical health and sickness 
(EH ‘Clever’: 2).  This example of the importance of changing one’s environment has both 
metaphorical and practical significance for Nietzsche. 
2.2 The Mental:  Feelings, Conscious and Unconscious 
Just as drives are the basic physical components of Nietzsche’s psychology, “feelings” 
are its basic mental components.  Our “feelings” include our affects and desires.  Importantly for 
Nietzsche, feelings are not metaphysical entities.  Our feelings originate in our drives, but are 
directed through a perspective at the objects in our environment needed to satisfy our drives.  
Through these perspectives, which determine how one “sees” the objects in the environment 
13 
needed to satisfy the drive, our drives are strengthened or weakened by interactions with the 
objects that they encounter.
13
   
Feelings have both a phenomenological dimension and an evaluative dimension.  The 
phenomenological dimension reflects the fact that feelings are manifestations of embodied drives 
and is the force or intensity of the feeling impelling us to act in order to satisfy the drive.  The 
evaluative dimension of our feelings has two possible sources: (1) the inclination or aversion of a 
drive toward an object, i.e., the “values” of the underlying drive, and/or (2) the moral values of 
one’s society and culture.    Once triggered by (a representation of) an object, a drive manifests 
itself through a feeling that reflects its own physical force and evaluative orientation toward the 
object.  In themselves, our feelings have no positive or negative moral value content, although 
the evaluative dimension of most people’s feelings also reflects a social or moral values “lens” or 
interpretation called the “conscience” (D 38).  Thus, at least in the case of the herd, the 
evaluative dimension of our feelings reflects the values of the culture or society into which one is 
born, and are either “inherited” unconsciously or acquired consciously through social 
indoctrination or early childhood training.  Our moral values are manifested through our 
conscience either consciously or unconsciously, although, as the product of our social 
environment, they originated in reflective consciousness.
14
   
Consciousness, for Nietzsche, corresponds to what one might refer to as “reflective 
consciousness.”  Consciousness is a late development in evolutionary history, according to 
Nietzsche, although humans act as if it had been ever-present or as if it were essential to 
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 Feelings originate in and manifest our drives, and are directed at objects through perspectives.  Other possible 
“feelings,” such as “needs,” might be either physical or mental.  (Maslow’s “hierarchy of needs” demonstrates these 
possibilities and more.)  
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 This is because, on Nietzsche’s view, moral values are social values, and would not have developed without the 
interpersonal communication through shared concepts and language that consciousness evolved to provide.  For this 
reason, we listen to our conscience as giving conceptually articulated commands, as evidenced by Nietzsche’s 
asking (in GS 345) “Why do you listen to the words of your conscience?” (emphasis added)    
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humanity (D 129).  Consciousness arose as a response to the need for communication in society 
(GS 354) and involves mental representation shared through concepts and language (Katsafanas 
2005: 1-2).  As members of a society, we need to be able to judge what others are going to do, 
which requires that we be able to perceive how others perceive us (e.g., as a threat or not).
15
  
Others therefore act as a mirror in which we are reflected: how we “see” ourselves, our self-
image, is often based on how others perceive us.  This is a problem because the words of our 
language are limited in number and often describe only extreme states (D 115).  As a result, we 
are seen by others (and ourselves) as having only a small number of “extreme” character traits (D 
381), while “the milder, or middle degrees, not to speak of the lower degrees [of a character trait] 
which are continually in play, elude us, and yet it is they which weave the web of our character 
and our destiny” (D115).    
Conscious mental processes “arrive on the scene” only after the behavior or action in 
question has already taken place, e.g., when things have not gone as expected and/or when a 
justification of our earlier behavior is needed.  Nietzsche paints a negative picture of 
consciousness because (1) its role is more limited than we commonly think it to be (GS 333), (2) 
it generalizes, simplifies and falsifies (GS 354), and (3) reflecting on what we are doing can 
often result in more harm than good.  On Nietzsche’s view, our mental processes are able to 
proceed unconsciously and do so most of the time: “[f]or the longest time, conscious thought was 
considered thought itself; only now does the truth dawn on us that by far the greatest part of our 
mind’s activity proceeds unconscious and unfelt […]” (GS333).  In fact, Nietzsche says that it 
may be only the stabilizing effect of our unconscious drives that keeps us from sometimes doing 
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 Hume expressed the importance of the relation between perception of character traits and civic well-being in 
terms of inference: the importance of being able to infer from character to behavior in order to be able to count on 
each other in society and of being able to infer from action to character for the purposes of reward or punishment 
(Russell 2014: 17). 
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dangerous things: without the “preserving alliance” of the much more powerful instincts which 
acts as a regulator over consciousness “humanity would have long ceased to exist” (GS 11).  
There is an important role for reflective consciousness in Nietzsche’s constructive philosophy, 
but its importance in the life of the herd has been greatly exaggerated, and even when we do 
consciously reflect, “the greatest part of conscious thought must still be accorded to instinctive 
activity” (BGE 3).  
Nietzsche addresses some of the complications that result from the fact that the 
evaluative dimension of our feelings can arise either from our drives themselves or from our 
society and culture.  Because our moral values are either unconsciously inherited or the result of 
early training, they are based on the feelings of others, and reflect the judgments and evaluations 
that were the original basis for those feelings: “[t]o trust one’s feelings—means to give more 
obedience to one’s grandmother and grandfather and their grandparents than to the gods that are 
in us: our reason and our experience” (D 35).  In summary, feelings originate in an unconscious 
physical drive and usually remain unconscious, although they can become conscious.  If they do 
become conscious, the same drive can be expressed by different feelings depending on the values 
of one’s social environment, “second nature,” or “conscience”:    
Drives transformed by moral judgments.  The same drive evolves into the painful 
feeling of cowardice under the impress of the reproach custom has imposed on 
this drive: or into the pleasant feeling of humility if it happens that a custom such 
as the Christian has taken it to its heart and called it good.  That is to say, it is 
attended by either a good or a bad conscience!  (D 38)  
 
Thinking of animals helps to clarify the role of consciousness in human life as Nietzsche 
saw it.  A squirrel can certainly identify food or other animals, but a squirrel is not “conscious” 
in the sense used by Nietzsche, since it does not possess concepts and language, or the ability to 
reflect and (e.g.) “decide” to skip lunch today.  Any squirrel has drives that motivate it to go 
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where the food is and to react if it senses danger.  Its drives will compete with each other and be 
nourished or diminished depending on their degree of satisfaction—in this it is no different from 
other animals and humans.  But the squirrel is different from Fido, the family dog, in an 
important way.  Fido has been “trained” by her owner through incentives that rearrange Fido’s 
drives by rewarding her when desirable drives are exhibited and “punishing” her when 
undesirable drives are displayed.  Fido has been trained, through commands backed up by 
positive and negative reinforcement, to fetch the morning paper, something not part of Fido’s 
animal nature, but now part of her “second nature.”  Humans have developed and learned a 
(more complex) set of communication symbols—a language—to meet more complex 
communication needs, and Nietzsche would say that we have been similarly domesticated or 
socialized.  This enables us to take on “socializing” values and feelings, or a “second nature.”  
While consciousness separates us from the animals, Nietzsche believes we have an exaggerated 
view of the importance of reason, reflection and deliberation, compared to the broader powers 
that we share with (non-human) animals. 
This completes my discussion of drives and feelings.  In the final section of the chapter, I 
present my reading of Nietzsche on behavioral and cognitive processes—how action and 
understanding are based on drives and feelings. 
2.3 Psychological Processes:  Behavioral and Cognitive 
At the beginning of the chapter, I noted that Nietzsche saw understanding as related to the 
behavior of one’s drives toward one another (GS 333), willing as the power relations of 
commanding and obeying that goes on in the “society of one’s drives” (BGE 19), knowledge as a 
certain stability in the organization of the drives (GS11) and the self as nothing more than “how 
one’s innermost drives stand with respect to each other” (BGE 6).  In these texts, Nietzsche 
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characterizes understanding, knowledge, willing and the self in terms of the behavior of one’s 
drives toward each other.  In the first two sections of this chapter, I presented my reading of 
Nietzsche on drives and the feelings that express them.  In this final section, I describe how 
Nietzsche’s account of psychological processes—both behavioral and cognitive—are based in 
his account of drives and feelings.
16
       
On my view, both behavior and cognition have three psychological components: attention 
(physical and necessary for both), motivation/understanding
17
 (unconscious and necessary for 
both), and reflection (conscious and not required for either).  Because action is the key to my 
reading of Nietzsche’s account of behavior and cognition, I will first describe the role of these 
three psychological components in a single action.  Acting is the interaction of one’s drives with 
the objects needed to satisfy them.  Acting is important because every action results in the 
strengthening of some drives and the weakening of others, resulting in a change in how one’s 
drives relate to each other.
18
   
The first of these psychological components, “attention,” is a physical process describing 
the initial contact of the embodied drive with an object in the environment.  Attention results in 
the brain’s construction of a mental representation of the content of a perception (called 
“awareness”), a “complex bundle of information that is often not accurate” but that is simplified 
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 Each of the three psychological processes that I refer to (attention, understanding and reflection) might be 
considered “conscious” in common usage, but on Katsafanas’ account of Nietzsche on consciousness, which I 
follow, only reflective consciousness (reflection) is considered to be “conscious.”  “Attention,” as noted below, is 
physical, and “understanding,” as I use the term, is usually not reflective.  On Nietzsche’s use of “consciousness,” 
our mental processes are able to proceed unconsciously, and “the greatest part of our mind’s activity proceeds 
unconscious and unfelt” (GS 333). 
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 Motivation is the unconscious component of action and behavior; understanding is the corresponding component 
of cognition. 
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 “Every moment of our lives sees some of the polyp-arms of our being grow and others of them wither, all 
according to the nutriment which the moment does or does not bear with it” (D 119). 
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to enhance effectiveness in satisfying the underlying drive (Graziano 2014: 12).
19
   It is attention 
that leads to the “triggering” of a drive by an object.   
The second of the three psychological components is motivation and is based in our 
feelings.  In the previous section, I described my reading of Nietzsche on both conscious and 
unconscious feelings.  There are three sources of motivation: (1) the force or intensity of the 
drive as manifested in a feeling; (2) the agent’s interpretation of her feeling based on the 
evaluative content of the triggered drive; and (3) the agent’s interpretation of her feeling based 
on the evaluative content of her conscience.   
The third of the three psychological components is the agent’s conscious reflection or 
deliberation (Katsafanas 2014: 210).  “Reflection” refers to our conscious mental activity, 
including memory, as well as deliberation and rational decision-making.  Reflection can be part 
of the process leading to action, but it is not required for acting. 
Katsafanas provides an account of how these three psychological processes, one physical 
and two mental, combine in the overall motive to act.  His “vector model of willing” enables us 
to understand the interaction of our unconscious feelings and conscious reflection or 
deliberation.  On Katsafanas’ account, an agent’s conscious deliberation does not suspend the 
force of her feelings, or result in a decision to act or a “triggering” of an action; instead, 
conscious deliberation gradually and incrementally strengthens or weakens the agent’s evaluative 
perspective on the object.  Similarly, on Katsafanas’ account, the agent’s feelings, as 
manifestations of her drives, actually influence her reflection and deliberation.  “Nietzsche 
argues that whereas we ordinarily conceive of reflective thought as operating in an instantaneous 
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 In neuroscience, “attention” has been defined as a mechanistic “process of enhancing some signals at the expense 
of others.”  Michael Graziano distinguishes two parts of “attention”:  first, a physical process involving embodied 
drives and objects in the environment, and second, the brain’s representation of the content of attention, designed for 
efficiency, not accuracy or completeness (Graziano 2014: 112). 
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fashion, its effects are actually gradual and incremental…it is merely one causal factor amongst 
many others” (Katsafanas 2014: 206).  On this account, reflective consciousness can be causally 
efficacious by adding to or subtracting from the cumulative motive to act.   
The following example illustrates how the psychological processes discussed above result 
in a single action.    
Attention (a physical process): It is late morning and Alice is walking home for 
lunch.  Her hunger drive is causing Alice to be oriented to her environment in a 
way that favors objects likely to satisfy it.  A restaurant catches her attention, and 
Alice’s brain represents the restaurant as something that could satisfy that drive. 
Her hunger drive is triggered. 
Motivation (an unconscious mental process):  Alice feels an attraction to the 
restaurant (her hunger drive), followed by a restraining feeling that it would be 
better to go home as she, frugal as she is, usually does (her conscience).  She is 
aware, but not reflectively conscious, of these feelings.  The force of the drive has 
been tempered by her inherited values, or conscience.   
Reflection (a conscious mental process):  At this point, Alice is not reflectively 
conscious of her conflicting perspectives on the restaurant.  Whether or not she 
eats lunch at the restaurant will depend on whether her hunger drive or conscience 
is stronger.  BUT, Alice might become conscious of her internal conflict, or e.g., 
remember that she already has lunch prepared at home, and pause to decide what 
she is going to do. If so, the result of her deliberation will enter into, not decide, 
the outcome of the calculation that will determine whether she eats at the 
restaurant or at home.   
 
This analysis of acting enables us to see how the behavior of the human agent is based in 
her drives and feelings.  But this example is limited to describing the consequences of a single 
drive seeking its satisfaction, and thus the origin of and process resulting in a single action.  Each 
action results in the strengthening of some drives at the expense of others, creating an imbalance 
of power relations that will need to be worked out among the drives.  Our everyday experience 
involves our total collection of embodied drives, constantly jostling each other in the competition 
for nourishment as we negotiate our physical and social environments.   
20 
But acting, and drives and feelings, are also the foundation of Nietzsche’s account of 
cognitive processes.  Paralleling my account of action, I see cognitive processes as also having 
three psychological components: attention, understanding and reflection.  Attention and 
reflective consciousness also play a role in Nietzsche’s account of cognitive processes, since on 
my reading of Nietzsche, cognitive processes—understanding and knowledge—are the result of 
an agent’s actions over a period of time.   
Since each action results in the strengthening of some drives at the expense of others, 
every action results in a change in the organization or power relations of the drives.  
“Understanding” is the process of bringing one’s drives back into balance, organization or 
hierarchy (GS 333), an unconscious process that can result in knowing or knowledge.
20
  
“Understanding” refers to the “behavior of the drives towards one another” (GS 333), the on-
going struggle within the “society of the drives.”   
Understanding is the result of questioning our physical environment either by (1) 
exposing objects to many drives by moving around in our physical environment, thereby taking 
the perspectives of different drives on an object, or (2) changing our physical environment in 
order to expose our system of drives to different objects, resulting in more opportunities for 
satisfying different drives.  I call the former “perceptual understanding” and the latter “self-
understanding.”  Perceptual understanding can result in one’s perceiving an object more 
“objectively” and results from taking the perspectives of many drives on that object.21  Self-
understanding can result in the emerging organization and hierarchy of our drives, as our drives 
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 I am referring to “understanding” and “self-understanding” to accommodate the idea that, according to Nietzsche, 
understanding is the process that begins with thinking and ends with knowing, where understanding is unconscious 
(not reflectively conscious), and knowing or knowledge is reflectively conscious.  Nietzsche states that knowing and 
knowledge is the “peaceful coexistence” that follows the process of understanding—the end of a long process of 
making peace that has become conscious (GS 333).           
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 “There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival “knowing”; and the more affects we allow to speak about 
a matter, the more eyes, different eyes, we know how to bring to bear on one and the same matter, that much more 
complete will our ‘concept’ of this matter, our ‘objectivity’ be” (GM III 12).  
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work out their internal power relations, and is itself the result of exposing our drives to different 
objects by changing our physical environment.   
Only by continuously exposing her drives to different objects by changing her physical 
environment will the experimenter gain understanding of their identity and power.  This is the 
process of acquiring self-understanding, a process that is unconscious, since the experimenter 
behaves the way she does as the result of her drives, not as the result of conscious reflection, 
deliberation or decision.  Eventually, at least in some cases, an experimenter will exercise 
enough of her drives by changing her environment (and the objects in it), and her strongest drive 
will take control and organize the rest of her drives into a hierarchy.   
I now present two texts to support my reading of Nietzsche’s process of understanding.  
The first illustrates perceptual understanding and how knowledge is achieved.  The second 
illustrates how self-understanding and the “hierarchy of drives,” important for my argument in 
this thesis, is achieved. 
What knowing means.  Non ridere, non lugere, neque detestari, sed intellegere!
22
 says 
Spinoza […] Yet in the final analysis, what is this intelligere other than the way we become 
sensible of the other three?  A result of the different and conflicting impulses to laugh, lament 
and curse?  Before knowledge is possible, each of these impulses must have presented its one-
sided view of the thing or event; then comes the fight between these one-sided views, and 
occasionally out of it a mean, an appeasement, a concession to all three sides, a kind of justice 
and contract; for in virtue of justice and a contract all these impulses can assert and maintain 
themselves in existence and each can finally feel it is in the right vis-à-vis all the others.  Since 
only the ultimate reconciliation scenes and final accounts of this long process rise to 
consciousness, we suppose that intelligere must be something conciliatory, just and good, 
something essentially opposed to the instincts, when in fact it is only a certain behavior of the 
drives towards one another (GS 333). 
   
Four important characteristics of the unconscious process of understanding are described 
in this passage.  First, many feelings or perspectives on the object (the manifestations of different 
drives) must be aired.  Second, these different feelings and perspectives and their underlying 
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 ‘not to laugh at or lament over or despise, but to understand’ Translation from note to GS 333 in Nauckhoff  
translation of GS. 
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drives must work out a working relationship or organization.  Third, only the result of this long 
process will rise to consciousness.  Fourth, although we sometimes think of understanding as 
something separate from and bent on controlling and opposing our drives, it is actually only an 
account of behavior of the drives toward one another. 
In the second passage, from EH, Nietzsche uses his own life as the basis for a helpful 
illustration of “how you become what you are,” i.e., how to achieve the hierarchy of the drives 
and become an Individual:  
In the meantime, the organizing, governing “idea” keeps growing deep inside—it 
starts commanding, it slowly leads back from out of the side roads and wrong 
turns, it gets individual qualities and virtues ready, since at some point these will 
prove indispensable as means to the whole,—one by one, it develops all the 
servile faculties before giving any clue as to the dominant task, the “goal,” the 
“purpose,” the “meaning.” […] Rank order of abilities; distance; the art of 
separating without antagonizing; not mixing anything, not “reconciling” anything; 
an incredible multiplicity that is the converse of chaos—this was the precondition, 
the lengthy, secret work and artistry of my instinct.  Its higher protection 
manifested itself so strongly that I had absolutely no idea what was going on 
inside me,—and then one day all my capacities leapt out, ripened to ultimate 
perfection.  I have no memory of having made an effort. (EH ‘Clever’: 9) 
 
Again, we see four steps.  First, the experimenter, powered by the drives she was 
born with, explores as many of her drives and qualities as possible.  Second the 
“governing ‘idea’”—her strongest drive—begins organizing the “converse of chaos” into 
a unity or organization.  Third, only at the end of the process does the resulting hierarchy 
leap to consciousness.  Fourth, the long process leading up to this went on unconsciously 
without reflective deliberation or conscious effort.  The strongest individual drive (or 
drives) is the “governing idea” that “keeps growing deep inside” and only “leapt out” 
after a long process of giving all of one’s “individual qualities and virtues” a chance to 
show their strength.   
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As I will discuss in later chapters, the freedom that Nietzsche thinks is possible, 
and that Nietzsche attempts to provoke in his readers, arises when—by constantly 
experimenting with her environment and activating different drives—the experimenter 
creates the conditions that enable the emergence of her strongest drives.  This freedom is 
characterized by its psychological structure.  The experimenter will enjoy the freedom to 
act motivated by her unique organization of drives and powers.  Although her actions will 
be determined by her drives, being “powered” by those drives that are most uniquely hers 
is a way of being powered by the drives that she “wants” to be in charge—a kind of 
compatibilist freedom.  Since she will have achieved self-understanding of her drives, as 
embodied in her body, she will have become an “Individual.”  This is the “substantive 
ideal” that Leiter refers to, described by Poellner as the result of “integrating an unusually 
great multiplicity of ‘drives’ and evaluative commitments into a long-lasting, coherent 
whole” (Leiter 2011: 110).  
But understanding is only the second of the three psychological components of cognition 
on my account.  There is one more: reflective consciousness.  While understanding is 
unconscious and difficult to achieve, with conscious knowledge of an object or one’s most 
powerful drives only emerging at the end of a long process, the experimenter already has a 
conscious “self-image” and a set of values to go with it, as evidenced by her conscience.  While 
understanding is unconscious, reflective consciousness does play a role in cognition, especially 
for the experimenter.  The experimenter will question her social or values environment just as 
she questioned her physical environment.  While understanding is the process of questioning her 
physical environment, reflection is the process of questioning her social environment and her 
values—the basis for interpreting, for seeing meaning.  Reflective consciousness can play an 
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important role in the way the experimenter sees herself—her “self-image”—and in the way 
others see her—her reputation.  Only if the experimenter identifies the source of her drives and 
feelings (through, e.g., the process of genealogy that Nietzsche illustrates in the GM), will she be 
able to think of her drives in new ways, perhaps changing them and, eventually, her feelings.   
The objective of this chapter has been to describe the components of Nietzsche’s 
psychology, with emphasis on the “hierarchy of drives.” In Chapter 3, I provide an alternative 
reading of Nietzsche’s critical philosophy and show how a constructive reading of his 
philosophy, based on the experimenter’s attaining the hierarchy of the drives, is possible.    
3 RESOURCES FOR THE EXPERIMENTER: NIETZSCHE’S CONSTRUCTIVE 
PHILOSOPHY 
In Chapter 2, I described the basic components of Nietzsche’s psychology.  In this 
chapter, I first describe Leiter’s reading of Nietzsche’s critical philosophy and then provide an 
alternative reading that accommodates Leiter’s reading of Nietzsche’s critical philosophy yet 
shows how a constructive reading of Nietzsche’s philosophy is possible.  Specifically, I argue 
that Nietzsche’s critical philosophy is best read as based on the elimination of metaphysical 
entities, not their associated mental processes—what I call the “no such entity” view.  I then use 
these mental processes to provide an account of three components of Nietzsche’s constructive 
philosophy: the individual, self-understanding and compatibilist freedom.  On my view, 
Nietzsche believes that there are “experimenters” who, although born into the values of the herd, 
refuse to accept them, and that this is the audience for whom his constructive philosophy is 
intended.  In Chapter 4, I compare the life of these “experimenters” to that of the herd in order to 
illustrate how the experimenter can potentially achieve individuality, self-understanding and 
freedom.  
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3.1 Methodology for a Constructive Philosophy:  Eliminating Metaphysical Entities 
In the Introduction, I contrasted two accounts of Nietzsche’s naturalism: Leiter’s account, 
based on types and type-facts, and the “no such entity” reading, attributed to Janaway and 
Katsafanas.  Leiter sees Nietzsche as a “speculative methodological naturalist,” whose goal is to 
provide an explanation of human social institutions and of human morality based on the relevant 
psychological and physiological facts in virtue of which one belongs to a particular type of 
person.  According to Leiter’s “Doctrine of Types,” “Each person has a fixed psycho-physical 
constitution, which defines him as a particular type of person.”  Leiter goes on to talk about “the 
relevant psycho-physical facts” as “type-facts,” and that “It is type-facts, in turn, that figure in 
the explanation of human actions and beliefs (including beliefs about morality)” (Leiter 2002: 
8).
23
  According to Leiter, Nietzsche’s arguments typically take the following form: “a person’s 
theoretical beliefs are best explained in terms of his moral beliefs; and his moral beliefs are best 
explained in terms of natural facts about the type of person he is (i.e., in terms of type-facts).” 
  Leiter distinguishes “the Humean Nietzsche,” “the Nietzsche who aims to explain 
morality naturalistically,” from the “Therapeutic Nietzsche,” “who wants to get select readers to 
throw off the shackles of morality” (Leiter 2013: 582).  Leiter sees the role of the affects in 
Nietzsche’s philosophy as limited to the response of his readers to the rhetorical features of his 
writing, through which Nietzsche seeks to gain their attention and involvement.  
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 “Type-facts, for Nietzsche, are either physiological facts about the person, or facts about the person’s unconscious 
drives or affects.  The claim then, is that each person has certain largely immutable physiological and psychic traits 
that constitute the “type” of person he or she is” (Leiter 2002: 91).  “Type-facts are causally primary with respect to 
the course of a person’s life”—in the sense that they “causally determine that person’s will”—and “type-facts are 
also explanatorily primary, in the sense that all other facts about a person (e.g., his beliefs, his actions, his life 
trajectory) are explicable by type-facts about the person (perhaps in conjunction with other natural facts about the 
circumstances or environment).”  According to Leiter’s reading, “consciousness is Kind-Epiphenomenal in the sense 
that conscious states are only causally effective in virtue of type-facts about the person (that is, not simply in virtue 
of their being conscious states).  Put more simply: consciousness is not causally efficacious in its own right.  While a 
person’s conscious states may be part of the causal chain leading up to action, they play that role only in virtue of 
type-facts about the person” (Leiter 2002: 91-92).  “This means that the real story of the genesis of an action begins 
with the type-facts, which explain both consciousness and a person’s actions” (Leiter 2002: 92).         
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While Janaway grants that Nietzsche is naturalistic, he believes that there is a second 
theme that is more central to Nietzsche’s philosophy.  This is the idea, drawing on Nietzsche’s 
philological training, that the grammatical structure of language influences our world-view and 
facilitates social communication and control.  On Janaway’s reading, Nietzsche argues that the 
ascetic ideal was made possible only because certain grammatical features of language (such as 
the subject/object and active/passive distinctions) encourage the belief in metaphysical entities 
(e.g., the soul) required for the initiation, propagation and practice of the ascetic ideal.  “This 
kind of human needs the belief in a neutral “subject” with free choice, out of an instinct of self-
preservation, self-affirmation, in which every lie tends to hallow itself” (GM I 13).  The member 
of the herd needs to believe that she is free and, as the “doer” of her deeds, is separate from her 
actions in order to see the strength of her oppressor as blameworthy, and her own weakness as a 
voluntary achievement.  Janaway reads Nietzsche as eliminating those metaphysical entities 
without which the ascetic ideal would not be possible, while explaining the underlying 
psychological processes “by invoking drives, instincts and affects which he locates in our 
physical, bodily existence” (Janaway 2007: 34).   
Katsafanas challenges Leiter’s argument that consciousness is epiphenomenal (and that 
conscious willing has no causal effect), by showing that the text featured in Leiter’s argument (“a 
thought comes when ‘it’ wishes, not when ‘I’ wish” (BGE 17)) is actually, when viewed in 
context, arguing against the existence of a metaphysical “ego” that is constantly surveying one’s 
inner goings-on, i.e., consciousness as a substantive faculty.
24
  On Katsafanas’s reading, this text 
(BGE 17) is not arguing against consciousness as a property of mental states (Katsafanas 2005: 
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 This can be shown by the full sentence from which this text is taken:  “A thought comes when ‘it’ wishes, not 
when ‘I’ wish, so that it is a falsification of the facts of the case to say that the subject ‘I’ is the condition of the 
predicate ‘think’” (BGE 17).  Katsafanas argues that other texts quoted by Leiter “are similarly unsupportive of his 
claim that consciousness is epiphenomenal.”  These include TI VI.3, which attacks the Will as a discrete faculty, and 
D 129 and GS 333, which address unconscious states, not conscious states (Katsafanas 2005: n.22). 
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12).  Katsafanas points to BGE 12, where Nietzsche says “Between you and me, there is 
absolutely no need to give up ‘the soul’ itself, and relinquish one of the oldest and most 
venerable hypotheses…” when there are useful alternative readings (such as “mortal soul,” “soul 
as subject-multiplicity,” and “soul as a society constructed out of drives and affects”) that do not 
posit the soul as a metaphysical entity.  Katsafanas sees Nietzsche telling us that “rather than 
assuming that ‘consciousness’ refers to a unitary faculty, we should treat ‘consciousness’ as 
referring to the sum total of conscious mental states” (Katsafanas 2005: 12).  
In this chapter, I examine the Similarity Thesis, the Transparency Thesis and the Free 
Will Thesis, the three descriptive components of Leiter’s characterization of human morality—
“Morality in the Pejorative Sense” (MPS)—in order to show that conceptions of the individual, 
self-understanding and freedom made available by the “no such entity” reading support the view 
that Nietzsche has both a critical and a constructive philosophy. 
3.2 An Alternative Conception of Humanity 
The first descriptive component of MPS that I discuss is the Similarity Thesis—“that 
because of the similarity of all humans, one morality is appropriate for all” (Leiter 2002: 80).  
This is required of any system of morality because, it is held, a code of morality has to apply 
universally if we are to hold people accountable for their actions.  Under Christianity, for 
instance, humans are inculcated with a “second nature”—all are assumed to share a “human 
essence” (GM I 13) in virtue of which humans are similar in values or “character,” and in their 
capacity to reason.   
On Leiter’s reading, Nietzsche argues that humans are not “similar,” because they can be 
ranked into different “types” based on their psycho-physical make-up.  Humans differ from one 
another in that they are constituted by different “type-facts.”  What is right for one person cannot 
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be right for another who is not of the same type or rank.  For this reason, no single morality can 
apply to everyone, and the Similarity Thesis cannot be correct.  I do not deny that Nietzsche 
argues against the Similarity Thesis on the basis of there being different types of humans, and I 
agree that Leiter’s explanation in terms of psycho-physical type-facts is successful in arguing 
against systems of morality making universal claims (such as MPS and the Similarity Thesis), 
but Leiter’s explanation does not preclude a new kind of “morality” (not in the pejorative sense) 
that does justice to the many and varied types of human beings.  My claim is that, on the “no 
such entity” reading, I can agree with Leiter about Nietzsche’s critical philosophy while still 
identifying in Nietzsche the resources for a constructive philosophy based on the individual.   
Why think that Nietzsche’s constructive philosophy is based on the individual?   
Nietzsche’s hope for the disruption of the ascetic ideal depends on individuals, as he states here: 
“I mean the individuals, the seed-bearers of the future, the spiritual colonizers and shapers of 
new states and communities” (GS 23); and here:   
When the highest and strongest drives erupt in passion, driving the individual up 
and out and far above the average, over the depths of the herd conscience, the 
self-esteem of the community is destroyed… its faith in itself, its backbone, as it 
were, is broken: as a result, these are the drives that will be denounced and 
slandered the most. (BGE 201) 
 
Nietzsche is concerned that the higher types of humans (and potential individuals) are deluded 
into thinking that Christianity is in their best interest, and he tries to dislodge them from that 
notion: “What is wanted [by Christianity] … is nothing less than a fundamental remolding, 
indeed weakening and abolition of the individual” (D 132).  Nietzsche does not assume that the 
mere existence of the higher types of humanity, i.e., those who have the right drives—will be 
enough to dislodge the ascetic ideal.  It will take some therapy to encourage the higher types to 
become Individuals. 
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The strongest argument in support of individuals may be based on Nietzsche’s relation to 
Schopenhauer.
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  Schopenhauer argued that the suffering that characterizes human existence is 
due largely to the passions, and that the passions are the source of one’s individuality.  The only 
way to overcome the inevitable pessimism of life is by eliminating these qualities and becoming 
one with the “larger whole”: by squelching the passions through contemplation or meditation, 
denying one’s individuality, and becoming one with the world.  While Nietzsche accepted much 
of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, he clearly wanted to combat Schopenhauer’s pessimism, and 
perhaps the clearest example of this was his efforts in his constructive philosophy to encourage 
those of the higher type to embrace their feelings and their individuality.  Nietzsche sees the 
experimenter (but not the herd) doing this by adopting as many different affects and perspectives 
as possible—by acquiring self-understanding.  For those with the right drives, “becoming an 
Individual” is the process of giving one’s drives a chance to show themselves by exposing them 
to as many objects as possible, until one’s drives organize themselves into a hierarchy.  
In this section, I have argued that the “no such entity” reading enables me to agree with 
Leiter that Nietzsche argues against systems of morality making universal claims, while claiming 
that Nietzsche’s critique of the Similarity Thesis as targeting the metaphysical soul, or Ego, as a 
separate faculty (GM I 13), leaves open the possibility for other conceptions of humanity such as 
suggested in BGE 12, including that of the individual. 
3.3 An Alternative Conception of the Self 
The second descriptive component of MPS is the Transparency Thesis: “that actions can 
be distinguished based on their respective motives” (Leiter 2002: 80).  The member of the herd 
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 Schopenhauer was Nietzsche’s greatest teacher, and as Janaway has suggested, much can be learned about 
Nietzsche by examining his relationship with this teacher.  Janaway sees Schopenhauer as “a recurring sub-text, and 
one of the key points of orientation in [Nietzsche’s] often bewildering progress” (Janaway 1994: 104).    
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believes that she possesses a metaphysically distinct soul or self, with character traits that can’t 
be changed but can be known by introspection or observation.  This is required by any system of 
morality, it is held, because one can’t assign praise or blame for an action without understanding 
why the agent did what she did, paralleling Hume’s belief that for a society to function we must 
be able to infer a person’s actions from her character in order to count on her to meet her 
obligations, and to infer her character from her actions in order to assess praise or blame (Russell 
2014: 11-12).  On Leiter’s reading, Nietzsche argues that the Transparency Thesis does not hold 
because actions cannot be distinguished based on their motives.  This is because an agent’s 
motives for an action are determined by type-facts, which are not consciously available to the 
agent, and largely unknown (GS 335) (Leiter 2002: 104).    
By contrast, I see Nietzsche arguing against the Transparency Thesis by arguing that 
there is no metaphysical entity called the “self”—no metaphysical self containing character traits 
or motives separate from the embodied set of drives.  If one, as a member of the herd, believes 
that the self is an entity separate from one’s embodied set of drives into which the agent has 
“privileged access” via introspection, or to which others can attribute character traits based on 
observing one’s behavior, knowledge of an agent’s motives will be impossible, since there is no 
such entity.  But, if by the “self” we mean our embodied set of drives, then some degree of 
transparency or self-understanding may be available.  On the “no such entity” reading, we can 
agree with Leiter that “the critical Nietzsche” sees one’s motives as “largely unknown” and still 
point to the constructive Nietzsche’s resources for acquiring self-understanding.   
Self-understanding, which I introduced in Chapter 2, is based on the behavior of our 
drives toward each other and the feelings that connect them to the objects in our environment.  
Self-understanding is acquired through changing the perspectives of our drives by exposing them 
31 
to different objects and is unconscious.  Experimenters differ from the herd in being born with 
different drives—drives that lead them to question their physical and social environments.  
Nietzsche’s constructive philosophy is aimed at these few in his audience. While there is no way 
that one can gain understanding of her drives by introspection (as the herd, who think that the 
self is a metaphysical entity, believe), Nietzsche’s hope is that some exceptional members of his 
audience can “choose” what lives they live by regularly changing their perspectives on and 
interactions with the physical world in order to exercise as many of their drives as possible—
thereby acquiring self-understanding.  The experimenter will continue to challenge and change 
her physical environment, exposing her drives to different objects, triggering her drives and 
adopting perspectives on objects as a result of the feelings that manifest her drives until, as a 
result of the process of nourishment and competition among the drives, they organize into a 
hierarchy.   
At this point the hierarchy of one’s drives becomes available to consciousness as a self- 
image.  This is one source of one’s self-image.  But the experimenter already had a (herd) self-
image, part of the “second nature” acquired through early-childhood interaction with her social 
environment.  Both a self-image and a reputation are necessary for us to function in society, and 
we initially acquire a self-image as part of our early childhood training or “second nature.”  The 
challenge now, for the experimenter who attains self-understanding, will be to revise her 
inherited self-image, i.e., to resolve the tension between the “new” self-image based on her “first 
nature” and her “old” self-image based on her “second nature.”   
3.4 An Alternative Conception of Freedom 
The third descriptive component of MPS as characterized by Leiter is the Free Will 
Thesis: that “human agents possess a will capable of free and autonomous choice” (Leiter 2002: 
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80).  This is required of any system of morality, it is held, because one can’t hold an agent 
responsible for her action if she had no alternative—if she did not have a choice between 
alternative courses of action (“regulative control”), where having such a choice is assumed to be 
constitutive of freedom.  On Leiter’s reading, free will is impossible; because the concept of a 
causa sui (a self-caused cause) is an absurdity (BGE 15), and there is no “conscious self that 
contributes anything to the process” of which our drives take charge (Leiter 2002: 100).   
As we saw in Katsafanas’ discussion of Leiter’s argument that consciousness is 
epiphenomenal, it is the ego, consciousness as a substantive faculty, that is fictional or 
epiphenomenal, not consciousness as a property of mental states (BGE 12).  Nietzsche is in fact 
arguing only against a metaphysically distinct entity called “the will,” and not against freedom or 
free willing per se.  In BGE 21, when Nietzsche rails against the “misconceived concepts” of 
“free will” and “unfree will,” calling them “basically an abuse of cause and effect,” his point is 
that there is no faculty or entity called “the will” to be “free” or “unfree,” other than the strong or 
weak drives in one’s embodied system of drives, each seeking satisfaction, strength and 
domination over the other drives in the system.   
Certainly there is no freedom of will of the kind required by MPS, since Nietzsche holds 
that determinism, or at least fatalism, is true and, as Leiter reads Nietzsche, that freedom would 
be either the freedom of a self-caused cause (causa sui), or the “freedom to do otherwise.”  But 
reading Nietzsche as arguing specifically against the existence of a metaphysically distinct 
faculty of the will—rather than against free will in a more general sense—allows us to agree with 
Leiter that Nietzsche argues that the causa sui is an absurdity and that there is no conscious self 
that is causally effective, and still argue that Nietzsche leaves open the possibility for non-
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metaphysical notions of willing
26
 and for senses of freedom other than “freedom to do 
otherwise,” i.e., we can read Nietzsche as a compatibilist. 
None of the commentators mentioned in the Introduction argues that Nietzsche allows for 
the ability to choose among alternative courses of action, “regulative control.”27  The positive 
program that they point to sees the experimenter as being able to act of her own free will, even if 
alternative courses of action are not available.  On the view of these commentators, Nietzsche’s 
positive program relies on a “source model” of control, i.e., that whether an agent’s action is free 
depends on whether it reflects her “true self”—whether it is truly hers.  I suggest that the 
“substantive ideal” that Leiter offers as a deflationary reading of the Sovereign Individual is the 
focus of Nietzsche’s constructive or practical philosophy i.e., the task of integrating one’s drives 
and values into a cohesive and lasting whole.   
While Nietzsche would think freedom of the will on the “Garden of Forking Paths” 
model of control is impossible, because he is a fatalist, Nietzsche’s thought does accommodate 
freedom based on a “source model” of control.  This second kind of freedom is (a) present in 
Nietzsche’s philosophy, (b) available to those with the right drives, and (c) not incompatible with 
determinism.  The processes of acquiring self-understanding and of questioning one’s self-
image, discussed in the previous section of this chapter, enable an agent to reflect her true self in 
her actions, i.e., to act with the freedom of a “source model” of control.  
At the beginning of this chapter I said that I would argue that Nietzsche has a 
constructive philosophy and that I would identify the resources that the “no such entity” reading 
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 Examples of non-metaphysical notions of willing include: the power relations of commanding and obeying that 
goes on in the society of one’s drives (BGE 19), or as cited from (BGE 12) above.  (I am ignoring non-metaphysical 
libertarian free will since such views would not be possible readings of Nietzsche.) 
27
 As noted in the Introduction, McKenna describes two ways that the definition of free will has been developed in 
the free will literature.  One concerns an agent’s alternative possibilities and “freedom to do otherwise,” what 
McKenna refers to as the “Garden of Forking Paths” model of control (McKenna 2009: 5).  The second concerns the 
source of an agent’s action, what McKenna refers to as the “source model” of control (McKenna 2009: 7).  Fischer 
refers to these as “regulative control” and “guidance control,” respectively.  
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makes available.  I contrasted the “no such entity” reading of the three descriptive components of 
Leiter’s MPS with his reading.  Instead of insisting on the psychological similarity of agents and 
the resulting appropriateness of one set of values, rules or morality, both assumptions being 
ridiculous according to Nietzsche, I argue that Nietzsche argues for the achievement of 
individuality through the attainment of self-understanding.  Instead of assuming transparency of 
the self—that our motives and the motives of others are readily available when they are not—I 
argue that Nietzsche shows how self-understanding is possible, at least for those with the right 
drives.  Finally, instead of the claim that responsibility requires alternative possibilities, when all 
agree such alternatives are not available in a determined world, I argue that Nietzsche looks to a 
different requirement for free will: identification of the action with the agent.   
In Chapter 4, I will illustrate the difference between Nietzsche’s critical and constructive 
philosophies by contrasting the practical lives of members of the herd and experimenters. 
4 THE FREEDOM OF THE EXPERIMENTER 
In Chapter 3, I argued that Nietzsche has a constructive philosophy and that the way to 
see that Nietzsche has the psychological resources for a constructive philosophy is to see his 
critical philosophy as directed at the elimination of metaphysical entities, not their associated 
psychological processes.  My aim in this chapter is to illuminate the difference between 
Nietzsche’s critical and constructive philosophies and to explain how, on the “no such entity” 
reading, freedom is possible for those experimenters who succeed in acquiring self-
understanding.  I do this by comparing the life of the herd, the subject of Nietzsche’s critical 
philosophy and Leiter’s reading, with the life of the experimenter.  
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4.1 Morality and the Herd 
Nietzsche’s critical philosophy is directed at herd morality.  Under the sway of a MPS, 
the member of the herd sees herself as moral to the degree that she subordinates her individual 
drives and the freedom to express them to the rule of the herd (GS 117).
28
  Most humans, born 
into herd morality, readily accept its socially prescribed values.  As a result, they tend to activate 
the same drives and hold the same values as their peers.  These values determine whether good 
or bad conscience is associated with a particular drive and they provide members of the herd 
with a common self-image. The herd do what is expected of them, believing that all have a 
similar “first nature” or human essence, when it is their “second nature” that is similar and 
common.
29
  The member of the herd sees no reason to question either her physical environment 
or her prescribed social values.  The member of the herd goes through life believing that humans 
are basically similar, that her motives can be known by herself and her peers, and that she has a 
faculty called “the will” that is free to choose between alternative courses of action—the three 
descriptive components of Leiter’s MPS.  The result is that the member of the herd provides 
relatively few of her drives with the opportunity to express themselves, compete against each 
other, and organize themselves into a hierarchy, resulting in her failure to attain individuality, 
self-knowledge and freedom.  Even if she does succeed in controlling and aligning her drives 
with the Christian values reflected in her good conscience, she will not have realized her 
individuality, because she will have conformed to social expectations; she will not have achieved 
self-knowledge, since she has not provided her most individual drives with opportunities for 
                                                 
28
 Morality serves those interests and “plants in us the need for limited horizons and the closest tasks.  It teaches a 
narrowing of perspective, and so, in a certain sense, stupidity as a condition for life and growth” (BGE 188). Indeed, 
Nietzsche goes so far as to say, “Morality is herd instinct in the individual” (GS 116).     
29
 Recall that, according to Nietzsche, our drives themselves, our unconscious “first nature,” have no moral value 
component.  Herd and non-herd alike, we “inherit” a set of values from the culture into which we are born.  “That is 
to say, it [a particular drive] is attended by either a good or a bad conscience!” (D 38).   
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satisfaction; and she will not enjoy freedom because she will not be acting in accordance with 
her strongest individual drives and the values that support them. 
4.2 Life as an Experimenter 
All humans born into Christian cultures either inherit herd values and feelings, or are 
indoctrinated with herd values as part of their early childhood education, i.e., they acquire a 
“second nature.”  Only a few (here called “experimenters”) are born with the drives required to 
break away from herd values.  In my discussion of drives as the physical components of 
Nietzsche’s psychology, I described how the drives search for objects to satisfy them without 
mental awareness or involvement of any kind.  Our drives and their operations are largely 
unknown to us, how they are strengthened or weakened is likewise unknown, and, consequently, 
their nourishment or lack thereof is “a work of chance” (D 119).30  Unlike members of the herd, 
who are content to stay in the same physical and social environments, and to continue activating 
the same drives, the experimenter—curious, questioning and skeptical because of the drives she 
is born with—regularly changes her environment, much like someone who visits a variety of 
locations in order to find one most suitable to her individual needs, or who tries different 
occupations in order to identify her strengths and weaknesses.  On Nietzsche’s fatalistic view of 
the drives, there is nothing we can do directly to change the intensity of our drives, i.e., the set of 
drives that we are born with is not in our control and we can’t just decide to be more brave and to 
take specific steps toward strengthening our drive for “bravery.”  Nietzsche describes in D 560 
the things that “we are at liberty to do” with respect to our drives and their environment, and the 
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 “[O]ur daily experiences throw some prey in the way of now this, now that drive, and the drive seizes it eagerly: 
but the coming and going of these events as a whole stands in no rational relationship to the nutritional requirements 
of the totality of the drives: so that the outcome will always be two-fold—the starvation and stunting of some and 
the overfeeding of others” (D 119). 
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extent to which humans do or do not pay attention to the environment of their drives and their 
power to influence them in this way. 
There are three ways that changing our physical environment can change our drives 
indirectly: first, by “nourishing” them to different degrees, depending on the objects encountered 
in the environment, strengthening some drives while weakening others; second, by “triggering” 
or activating drives not previously manifested; and third, as a result of the “chance” nature of 
their nourishment, depriving a drive of nourishment and causing it to wither away.  By 
“triggering” and (as a result) “nourishing” different drives, the experimenter will become aware 
of her most powerful drives through the perspectives of the mental states that express them.     
Only by continuously testing her drives by changing her physical environment and 
exposing her drives to different objects will the experimenter gain knowledge of their identity 
and power.  This is the process of acquiring self-understanding, a process that is unconscious 
(not reflectively conscious), since the experimenter behaves the way she does as the result of the 
drives she was born with, not as the result of conscious intention or decision.  Eventually, if she 
has exercised enough of her drives by changing her environment (and the objects in it), the 
experimenter’s strongest drive(s) will take control and organize the rest of her drives into a 
hierarchy.  Since she will have achieved self-understanding of her drives, as embodied in her 
body: this is the process of becoming an Individual.  This is the “substantive ideal” that Leiter 
refers to, described by Poellner as the result of “integrating an unusually great multiplicity of 
‘drives’ and evaluative commitments into a long-lasting, coherent whole” (Leiter 2011: 110).  
In Chapter 2, I introduced a text from EH, where Nietzsche uses his own life as the basis 
for a helpful illustration of “how you become what you are,” i.e., how one becomes an 
Individual:  
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In the meantime, the organizing, governing “idea” keeps growing deep inside—it 
starts commanding, it slowly leads back from out of the side roads and wrong 
turns, it gets individual qualities and virtues ready, since at some point these will 
prove indispensable as means to the whole,—one by one, it develops all the 
servile faculties before giving any clue as to the dominant task, the “goal,” the 
“purpose,” the “meaning.”  (EH ‘Clever’: 9) 
 
I noted that the freedom that Nietzsche attempts to provoke in his readers, arises 
when—by constantly experimenting with her environment and activating different 
drives—the experimenter creates the conditions that enable the emergence of her 
strongest individual drives.  The Individual will enjoy the freedom to act motivated by 
her unique hierarchy of drives and powers.  This freedom is characterized by its 
psychological organization or structure.  Although her actions will be determined by her 
drives, being “powered” by those drives that are most uniquely hers is a way of being 
powered by the drives that constitute her “true self,” a system of drives with which she 
identifies.  My reading of Nietzsche is similar to Frankfurt’s hierarchical account of 
compatibilist freedom.
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  According to Frankfurt, a person who enjoys both freedom of 
action and freedom of will “is not only free to do what he wants to do; he is also free to 
want what he wants to want.  It seems to me that he has, in that case, all the freedom it is 
possible to desire or to conceive” (Frankfurt 1988: 22). 
I now shift the focus of discussion from (unconscious) self-understanding to (conscious) 
self-image.  Like the herd, the experimenter is born into a society and a culture.  Like the herd, 
she acquires a self-image as part of her early childhood training, and learns that her behavior 
                                                 
31
 Frankfurt’s idea is that agents will identify with an action, A, seeing it as representing their free will to the extent 
that they have ‘a second order volition’ to do A.  And they will have such a [second order] volition to do A, he says, 
so far as they want to be controlled by the desire to do A; they want it to be the desire that moves them effectively to 
act [emphasis added] (Frankfurt 1988: 15). 
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should support that self-image.
32
  Because she acquires this self-image from her society and 
culture, it will reflect how others see (or want to see) her, not her own individual drives and 
feelings.  Nietzsche observes that although each of us is comprised of a large number of drives, 
we generally see one another as exhibiting at most one or two character traits (D 381).
33
  
Moreover, because we often base our self-image on the way others see us, the distorted view that 
others have of our character will have a simplifying and negative effect on how we see ourselves 
(D115).
34
  Consequently, unless we question our self-image, it will reflect the values “learned” 
as part of our childhood training, and will be based, not on our own drives, but on the values of 
our ancestors (D35).   
Prior to achieving the hierarchy of her drives, herd values will determine the content of 
the experimenter’s conscience, i.e., what drives are approved or disapproved by her good and 
bad conscience, respectively.  But, now that she has become an Individual and has (at least 
some) knowledge of the identity and power of her drives—she will no longer be happy with her 
self-image (the way she sees herself) or with her reputation (the way she is seen by others), both 
of which are likely to reflect only one or two of her drives (manifested in her behavior as 
character traits), which may not be those with which she identifies.  The Therapeutic Nietzsche, 
as Leiter refers to Nietzsche’s rhetorical skills and aims, hopes to provoke the “unhappy” 
Individual into investigating the origins of her herd values either directly or by reading his own 
genealogical investigations as reported in GM.  Just as the Individual changes her physical 
environment in order to activate more of her drives in the quest for self-understanding, 
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 Our childhood education, our “second nature,” is based on the needs of society:  “Education results in our second 
nature, which some of us snakes can throw off when our first nature has become mature” (D 455). 
33
 We cannot directly observe a person’s drives, but we do observe the character traits exhibited in another’s 
behavior, where traits of character are seen to reflect a person’s drives. 
34
 Nietzsche addresses this interesting complication in D115:  “Our opinion of ourself, however, which we have 
arrived at by this erroneous path, the so-called ‘ego’, is thenceforth a fellow worker in the construction of our 
character and our destiny.” 
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Nietzsche’s hope is that she will question her social environment, i.e., the values and self-image 
that she has inherited as her “second nature.”  The Individual reflects on her self-image, 
attempting to challenge or dislodge it, motivated by the tension between the socially-prescribed 
values of this “second nature” and values consistent with the knowledge that she has acquired of 
the identity and power of her own individual drives.   
In a general way, Nietzsche speaks of the positive effect on anyone of having an “overall 
philosophical justification of one’s way of living and thinking” (GS 289).  But the Individual’s 
self-image will need to be more than that.  Her self-image will need to reflect her “character,” the 
result of combining her own drives with the values and behavioral characteristics of her social 
peers, somehow brought in to balance.  Nietzsche stresses the importance of “‘giving style’ to 
one’s character” whereby one will “survey all the strengths and weaknesses that their nature has 
to offer and then fit them into an artistic plan.”  “Giving style to one’s character” can involve (for 
example) surveying our strengths and weaknesses, retaining desirable parts of our second nature, 
hiding undesirable parts of first nature, and removing or hiding the ugly, fitting all these into an 
artistic plan such that even our weaknesses fit in positively: in the end it appears to be the work 
of a single taste—“it’s enough that it was one taste” (GS 290).  Nietzsche recognizes that there is 
value in being perceived as possessing a stable and unchanging character: “A firm reputation 
used to be a thing of utmost utility; and wherever society is still ruled by herd mentality it is still 
today most expedient for everyone to act as if his character and occupation are unchangeable, 
even if basically they are not” (GS 296).   
But as the Individual gains understanding of her drives, she realizes that her strongest 
individual drives are reflected in her “bad conscience,” while the herd values that she is 
increasingly questioning are reflected in her “good conscience.” Because conscience is how the 
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herd morality and the ascetic ideal exert their control, the Individual is not free from this external 
control as long as her good conscience reflects Christian values.  At some point, the tension 
between conflicting drives and values may push her to exercise her “intellectual conscience”—to 
question her conscience and the values it reflects.
35
  The Individual will not be satisfied with 
herself unless and until she can “rely” on her “good conscience,” i.e., until her “good 
conscience” is aligned with the values reflective of her strongest individual drives instead of with 
Christian values.  Nietzsche talks about the resulting need for a reversal of the values attached to 
good and bad conscience in GM II 24: 
For all too long man has regarded his natural inclinations with an “evil eye,” so 
that in him they have finally become wedded to “bad conscience.”  A reverse 
attempt would in itself be possible—but who is strong enough for it?—namely to 
wed to bad conscience the unnatural inclinations, all those aspirations to the 
beyond, to that which is contrary to the senses, contrary to the instincts, contrary 
to nature, contrary to the animal—in short the previous ideals which are all ideals 
hostile to life, ideals of those who libel the world. (GM II 24) 
 
If the Individual is strong enough, she will change her self-image and see herself differently.  By 
interpreting herself differently, she will “take responsibility” for herself, she will give herself a 
new meaning to replace the meaning that the ascetic ideal can no longer provide for her.  By 
taking responsibility (an act of reflective consciousness) for herself she will have taken 
responsibility for her future actions, thereby exercising sovereignty over her drives.   
In Chapter 3, I described how the “no such entity” reading makes resources available by 
looking at each of the three descriptive components of MPS.  In this chapter, I have highlighted 
the difference between Nietzsche’s critical and constructive philosophies in order to show how 
the “no such entity” reading supports Nietzsche’s constructive philosophy.  According to the 
                                                 
35Nietzsche asks, “Why do you listen to your conscience?  What gives you the right to consider such a judgment true 
or infallible?  Your judgment that ‘this is right’ has a pre-history in your drives, inclinations, aversions, experiences 
and what you have failed to experience: you have to ask ‘how did it emerge there?’ and then ‘what is impelling me 
to listen to it?’  There are a hundred ways to listen to your conscience” (GS 335). 
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Similarity Thesis, members of the herd assume that there is only one type of person, and that 
there is a metaphysically distinct human self, or essence, which is common to all humans (TI 4).  
Once the experimenter rejects the common metaphysical picture of the self that is integral to the 
herd self-image, she is left to make what she can of her individual body and drives in the 
environments that she finds herself.  From a practical, internal standpoint, once someone has 
rejected the idea that all have a common human essence or character, one has no alternative but 
to act as an individual agent questioning her physical and social environments until her drives 
organize themselves into a hierarchy and she achieves self-understanding, at which point the 
Individual is in a position to question her values and take responsibility for her self-image and 
reputation.   
According to the Transparency Thesis, members of the herd assume not only that they 
have a metaphysical “self” or “character” that they share with all humans, but also that they have 
the ability to know the motives of themselves and others.  The herd thinks they (can) know their 
strengths and weaknesses, and that—since all are similar—they can assume that their assessment 
of the strengths and weaknesses of others are reliable.  Nietzsche says this is nonsense: we can 
never completely know our drives.  But, from the practical standpoint, by “experimenting,” i.e., 
by questioning her physical and conceptual environments, the experimenter can, in rare cases, 
gain both perceptual knowledge and self-understanding (culminating in becoming an Individual), 
and a revised self-image that she is happy with (culminating in becoming a SI). 
According to the Free Will Thesis, members of the herd believe that they have free will, 
in the sense that they believe that they have a faculty called “the will” and that it is free (self-
created), and that they are justifiably held responsible for their actions because they could always 
have freely done something other than what they did.  The critical Nietzsche argues, of course, 
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that this notion of free will as causa sui is nonsense.  But, from a practical standpoint, the 
acquisition of self-understanding and a revised self-image can result in freedom.  The first kind 
of freedom is structural: becoming an Individual, becoming who we are, by enabling one’s drives 
to battle it out until one’s strongest drives take control and organize the rest of one’s drives into a 
hierarchy.  The Individual continues to question her “second nature,” the values that she 
inherited from her society.  If she is strong enough, she will “take responsibility” for herself, 
style her character, and give herself meaning by seeing or interpreting herself differently, to 
replace the meaning that the ascetic ideal no longer provides. If she is both strong and lucky, she 
will experience a realignment of her good conscience with her first nature.  This Individual who 
has experienced such a realignment of conscience is what Nietzsche calls the Sovereign 
Individual.  On Nietzsche’s view, freedom is not something that makes one fit to be held 
responsible: holding oneself responsible—seeing oneself a certain way—makes one free.   
In Chapter 5, I will argue that the sovereignty of the Sovereign Individual is compatible 
with Nietzsche’s fatalism. 
5 SELF-UNDERSTANDING AND SELF-CONTROL: NIETZSCHE’S 
COMPATIBILISM  
I have argued that there are reasons to think Nietzsche has both a critical and a 
constructive philosophy, and that on his constructive view an experimenter can enjoy 
compatibilist freedom.  In Chapter 4, I compared Nietzsche’s critical and constructive 
philosophies in practice.  I described how an experimenter could acquire self-understanding, the 
result of her drives’ achieving an organizational hierarchy, thereby illustrating the freedom of the 
Individual in Nietzsche’s philosophy.  I then described how an Individual can attain a second 
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kind of freedom by questioning and revising her self-image by taking responsibility for her 
drives, becoming, in rare cases, what Nietzsche refers to as a Sovereign Individual.  This chapter 
defends the claim that this freedom is compatibilist by showing that the constructive Nietzsche 
can respond to the objections to compatibilism cited by Leiter and other incompatibilists.   
5.1 Nietzsche on Freedom 
On Leiter’s reading, Nietzsche argues against Morality in the Pejorative Sense (MPS) by 
arguing that the freedom required for the Free Will Thesis of MPS does not exist.  Leiter 
attributes two arguments against freedom of the will to Nietzsche, the “causa sui argument” and 
the “naturalistic argument.”  The causa sui argument targets the herd’s belief that the will acts 
independently of causal determination—it is a self-caused cause.  Nietzsche refers to the causa 
sui argument as “thoroughly absurd” (BGE 15) and “the best self-contradiction that has ever 
been conceived” (BGE 21).  The “naturalistic argument,” based on Leiter’s theory of type-facts, 
argues that the conscious will has no causal role in action.  Only type-facts are causally 
efficacious, and type-facts explain both the person’s consciousness (e.g., when a thought enters 
her consciousness) and action.  The conscious will is epiphenomenal and has no causal effect 
(Leiter 2002: 92-93).  Leiter sees Nietzsche as an incompatibilist, since (as I discuss below) even 
though he does not see Nietzsche as a “classical determinist,” he does argue that the causal 
efficacy of type-facts rules out any role for the conscious will—and the freedom required by the 
Free Will thesis.  In contrast, I will argue that the process of becoming an Individual (based on 
achieving a hierarchical organization of one’s drives) is importantly similar to Frankfurt’s 
hierarchical account of freedom of will and that the constructive Nietzsche, as represented in the 
experimenter, can also be seen to exhibit a compatibilist account of freedom of will. 
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5.2 Leiter against Compatibilism 
Leiter recognizes that compatibilists (including Hume) have argued that causal 
determinism does not rule out freedom and moral responsibility—all that is required is that the 
will be determined in the right sort of way.  On a compatibilist reading, type-facts could explain 
the causal history of an action performed freely in virtue of, e.g., the person’s identifying with 
that causal history.  Leiter discusses three objections to hierarchy-based accounts
36
  of 
compatibilism: (1) the compatibilist is unable to come up with an account of the source of the 
second-order desires featured in accounts like Frankfurt’s; (2) the compatibilist faces the specter 
of an infinite regress in choosing between competing second-order desires; (3) on Nietzsche’s 
account the agent has no way of knowing the sources of her actions because the sources 
generally cited are epiphenomenal and the real causes are type-facts (not available to 
consciousness and unknown to the agent), so no one could identify with them.
37
  And he argues, 
“after a quarter of a century of philosophical debate, it should be plain that hierarchical accounts 
of free will have failed…indeed it is striking that all philosophical accounts of free will (at least 
the one’s designed to underwrite moral responsibility) are dismal failures” (Leiter 2002: 94).   
Now we come to an interesting complication.  As suggested earlier, Leiter does not 
characterize Nietzsche as a “determinist” 38 or “fatalist” as those terms are usually understood, 
but as a “causal essentialist.”  “Causal Essentialism” is the view that “for any individual 
substance (e.g., a person or some other living organism) that substance has “essential” properties 
that are causally primary with respect to the future history of that substance, i.e., they non-
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 As noted earlier, my reading of Nietzsche shares relevant features with Frankfurt’s structural account of 
compatibilist freedom.   
37
 Leiter cites Watson 1987 and Velleman 1992 on objections (1) and (2). 
38
 Leiter distinguishes between “classical determinism,” “classical fatalism” and “causal essentialism.”  (2002, 82-
83).  “Classical Determinism” is the view that “for any event p at a time t, p is necessary given the totality of facts 
prior to t, together with the actual laws of nature.”  “Classical Fatalism” is the view that “whatever happened had to 
happen, but not in virtue of the truth of classical determinism.”   
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trivially determine the space of possible trajectories for that substance” (Leiter 2002: 82-83).  
“Causal Essentialism” combines features of determinism (it’s based on type-facts that have 
causal efficacy) and fatalism (the outcome is set by the drives, but there is some room for 
variation depending on the environment).  On Leiter’s view, Nietzsche is a “Causal Essentialist” 
(a kind of fatalist) who holds that human agents do not possess the kind of freedom required for 
moral responsibility.   
But Leiter is aware that his own attribution of Causal Essentialism opens up a way to 
think of Nietzsche as a compatibilist, based on the fact that some of what happens depends, at 
least in part, on values and the environment.  As Leiter notes: on its face, causal essentialism 
appears to provide the basis for a compatibilist account in “the conceptual space between Causal 
Essentialism (the heart of Nietzsche’s fatalism) and Classical Determinism” (Leiter 2002: 98).  It 
turns out that Leiter does not specifically address the “conceptual space” argument.  Instead he 
(takes a step back and) invokes Galen Strawson’s much broader “Impossibility of Moral 
Responsibility” argument.  Strawson’s broad-gauged argument can be stated rather simply, and 
is claimed to be effective against any conception of freedom intended to underwrite moral 
responsibility—of the sort that grounds non-consequentialist desert—whether based on 
determinism, indeterminism, or (presumably) causal essentialism.   
Leiter paraphrases Strawson’s argument: “If, in other words, we are not causa sui, then 
everything about our will (and, consequently, about our actions) is causally determined by 
something about the ‘way we already are’—including those operations of will in which we 
attempt to alter ‘the way we already are’” (Leiter 2002: 90).  Strawson provides the following 
summary of his argument: 
(1) You do what you do, in any situation in which you find yourself, because of the way you 
are. 
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So 
 
(2) To be truly morally responsible for what you do you must be truly morally responsible 
for the way you are—at least in certain crucial mental respects. 
 
        But 
 
(3) It is not possible for you to be truly morally responsible for the way you are, without 
having intentionally brought it about that you are as you are now, and that you have 
brought this about in such a way that you can now be said to be truly responsible for 
being the way you are now.  This sets one off on an infinite regress. 
 
According to one commentator, this argument has drawn many responses and persuaded 
few (Clarke 2005: 13).  I will describe two points raised by Randolph Clarke against this 
argument that need to be addressed by Strawson before more readers should find it convincing.  
The first is that the argument leaves out a key premise that, once identified, should require that 
Strawson provide further argument.  The second concerns the definition of “moral 
responsibility.”    
Clarke makes the point that: “Accounts of free action are often meant to be accounts of 
how it can be that, even if it is not up to an agent how she is mentally, her action can be still up 
to her, [i.e., that] she can still have a choice about whether she performs that action, even when 
she acts for a reason” (Clarke 2005: 16).  Since Strawson’s argument does not allow for the 
possibility of any such choice, Clarke suggests that the following two additional premises need 
to be inserted between Strawson’s premises (1) and (2), in order to highlight this disagreement 
with his opponents.   
(O) When you do what you do because of the way you are, to be truly morally responsible 
for what you do, either (a) you must be truly morally responsible for the way you are, 
at least in certain crucial mental respects, or (b) it must be up to you whether if you 
are that way, in certain crucial mental respects, then you perform that action;  
 
and 
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(P) When you do what you do because of the way you are, it is not possible for it to be up 
to you whether if you are that way, in certain crucial respects, then you perform that 
action. 
 
Clarke suggests that, since Strawson accepts (P) and many of his opponents reject it, he 
needs to provide an argument for it if he is to convince them of his argument.  However, Clarke 
also points out that followers of Frankfurt’s hierarchical account of compatibilism, usually 
referred to as “semi-compatibilists,” reject (O).  Semi-compatibilists accept that the ability to do 
otherwise is incompatible with determinism, but hold that responsibility does not require the 
ability to do otherwise: responsibility is compatible with determinism (Clarke 2005: 19).   
The second objection raised by Clarke relates to Strawson’s definition of “true moral 
responsibility” as “responsibility of such a kind that, if we have it, then it makes sense, at least, 
to suppose that it could be just to punish some of us with (eternal) torment in hell and reward 
others with (eternal) bliss in heaven” (Strawson 1994: 216).  Clearly, the kind of freedom that 
would be required to underwrite this kind of responsibility is a high bar, although Strawson 
thinks that many feel they have it.  Nonetheless, Strawson’s argument does require that one be 
“truly morally responsible” for “the way you are” in this “heaven and hell” sense, so it is not 
surprising that moral responsibility turns out to be impossible.  As Clarke points out, the question 
is whether a less severe characterization of moral responsibility, perhaps one described in terms 
of appropriateness of reactive attitudes of praise and blame backed up by suitable rewards and 
punishments, might adequately characterize genuine moral responsibility, and if so, whether the 
kind of freedom that would be required to underwrite this characterization might be possible 
(Clarke 2005: 22).   
I have cited arguments that have been raised against Strawson’s Impossibility of Moral 
Responsibility argument, the argument that Leiter calls on for support in arguing that 
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compatibilism has been decisively disproven and that any attempts to argue that Nietzsche could 
be a compatibilism are doomed.  But even if Leiter’s arguments against compatibilism are seen 
to be convincing, Clarke’s article shows that Strawson does not engage with the kind of 
compatibilist that I take Nietzsche to be, nor is the notion of “heaven and hell” moral 
responsibility that Strawson employs relevant to the discussion of the experimenter in 
Nietzsche’s constructive philosophy.39  Now that I have argued that Leiter has not shown that 
compatibilism is a non-starter, I move on to argue that Nietzsche’s constructive philosophy, as 
described in Chapters 2-4, is compatibilist.  I argue that the “conceptual space” between 
determinism and Causal Essentialism does provide the experimenter with the opportunity for 
compatibilist freedom.   
5.3 Responding to the Classical Incompatibilist Argument 
Here is an overview of the second part of this chapter.
40
   As outlined by Michael 
McKenna, there are two incompatibilist arguments.  In order to argue that Nietzsche is a 
successful compatibilist, I must show that he can respond to the incompatibilist claim that for an 
agent to be free, either (1) she could have done otherwise, or, (2) if it is an action for which the 
agent has no alternatives, that it was in fact the agent who caused it—that it is truly her action.  
Some compatibilists argue that an agent can act freely even if she is unable to do otherwise by 
offering a “deep self” or “mesh” analysis of freedom that is based on the interrelationship of the 
various components of an agent’s psychology at the time of her action.  Incompatibilists then 
question (1) whether that psychological structure is up to the task expected of it or (2) whether 
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 I should note that this notion of “heaven and hell” moral responsibility is a feature of Christian herd morality (and 
a target of Nietzsche’s critical philosophy) and that Strawson also reflects Christian beliefs in “heaven and hell” in 
his argument.  Similarly, Strawson follows Nietzsche in rejecting the causa sui notion of free will. 
40
 This second part of the chapter relies for its overall structure on the summary outline of incompatibilist 
arguments—and the account of efforts of contemporary compatibilists to respond to these arguments—contained in 
Michael McKenna’s Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) articles “Compatibilism” and “Compatibilism: 
State of the Art,” (SEP-Supplement) both dated 2009.    
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the structure, in itself, shows that the agent is the “ultimate source” of her action—that the action 
is truly hers and reflective of her self.  I argue that this first question, in Nietzsche’s case, refers 
to the process of “becoming an Individual” through the experimenter’s drives’ adopting a 
hierarchy with the drive(s) she most identifies with in charge, and that the second question 
relates to the Individual’s taking responsibility for herself by interpreting or seeing herself a 
certain way, i.e., consistent with the values of the drives with which she identifies.  
Here is the CLASSICAL INCOMPATIBILIST argument (CIA):
41
 
1. If a person acts of her own free will, then she could have done otherwise. 
2. If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise than one actually does. 
3. Therefore, if determinism is true, no one acts of her own free will. 
 
According to Nietzsche’s constructive philosophy, the experimenter acts freely even if she could 
not have done otherwise.  Nietzsche is seen as arguing against the first premise of the CIA by 
arguing that freedom does not require alternative possibilities.  On my reading of Nietzsche, the 
process of acquiring self-understanding provides the resources to respond to the CIA.
42
  
Although our actions are determined by our drives, being “powered” by those drives that are 
most uniquely our own is a way of being powered by the drives that we “want” to be in charge. 
The key to freedom is therefore to become an Individual—to successfully become, or realize, our 
own set of drives—“to become who we are” (GS 335).  This kind of freedom is structural: 
“becoming who we are” is the process of enabling our drives to “battle it out” until our strongest 
drive takes charge and a hierarchy emerges.  The establishment of this hierarchy, commanded by 
our “most nourished” and strongest drives reflects an organization of our drives that is similar in 
structure to the hierarchy of desires that is the foundation of Frankfurt’s account of 
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 McKenna 2009: 6. 
42
 I see conscious self-understanding, self-image, as enabling Nietzsche to respond to the second incompatibilist 
argument, the Source Incompatibilist Argument (SIA) addressed below.   
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compatibilism.  The experimenter of Nietzsche’s constructive philosophy can attain a kind of 
freedom based on a “source model” of control in virtue of the fact that her strongest and most 
personal drives are at the top of the hierarchy of her drives, rather than on the availability of 
alternatives.  Both Nietzsche and Frankfurt can be seen to respond to the first premise of the 
CIA: The agent who desires to desire what she desires (whose second-order desires are aligned 
with her first-order desires) is similar to the case of the Nietzschean agent whose drives are 
controlled by the drives she identifies with.  In each case, the resulting structure is key.      
Not surprisingly, given the parallels between this account of freedom and Frankfurt’s, the 
account I attribute to Nietzsche needs to be able to respond to the objections that have been 
leveled at Frankfurt.  The first, “hierarchical problem,” can be expressed as follows: if a person 
can have conflicting first-order desires that require resolution at the second-order level, why 
think the person could not have conflicting second-order desires requiring in turn a deciding 
third-order desire—with further possible stalemates?  Frankfurt’s account (and by extension, 
Nietzsche’s) is incomplete, and “needs supplementing to avoid a spiraling recurrence of 
challenges to an agent’s freedom,” i.e., the threat of an infinite regress (McKenna 2009: 27, 
discussing Watson 1975).  Like Frankfurt, Nietzsche’s account of freedom features an 
organization or hierarchy—a hierarchy of drives.  On my account, however, the constructive 
Nietzsche can respond to this objection because the number of any human’s drives is finite and 
freedom is a function of the relations among the full set of drives.  Any potential regress would 
end if and when the experimenter’s drives formed a hierarchy and she became an Individual. 
The second objection, the “mesh problem,” is that the interrelationship or structure of 
desires that is the key feature of this kind of compatibilism may not, in itself, be enough to 
ensure the freedom of the agent.  As McKenna describes it: “According to Frankfurt, if freely 
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willed action for which an agent is morally responsible is purely a function of the relation 
between an agent’s will and her second-order volitions, then it does not matter in any way how 
an agent came to have that particular mesh.  But cases can be constructed that seem to suggest 
that it does matter how an agent came to have a particular mesh between her first-order and her 
second-order desires” (McKenna 2009: 27).  Cases can be constructed in which the agent would 
appear to meet the requirements for acting freely on Frankfurt’s account but where the agent 
would not be acting freely, based on our intuitions, e.g., in cases of hypnosis and brainwashing.
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   The problem here is the threat of manipulation.  Leiter describes this objection in terms of the 
compatibilist not being able to know the source of her second-order desires or (an additional 
objection specific to his account) the sources of her actions (since they are type-facts and 
unknowable to her).   
 The fact that Nietzsche’s account relies on self-understanding based on the power 
relations of the feelings that manifest her drives, as interpreted through her values, makes the 
experimenter (or, if her drives have organized themselves into a hierarchy, the Individual) less 
subject to manipulation than the herd.  In fact, Nietzsche would argue that most people, being 
members of the herd, are manipulated, because they are motivated by socially accepted drives 
and not by those with rank within their own drive hierarchy.  Nonetheless, even if a person 
becomes an Individual, a deterministic interpretation could be given that the resulting action or 
formation of the Individual is the result of the agent’s drives (including the fact that she 
happened to have been born with the right drives) combined with her environment.  That is why 
becoming an Individual is necessary but not sufficient for the freedom (sovereignty) of the 
Individual—she could still be manipulated.  Nietzsche seems to acknowledge this by requiring 
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 Frankfurt does respond to the mesh problem by requiring that an agent’s identification must be active.  Her stance 
towards her own will is that it determines itself (1994).  She and it are fully integrated.  When an agent’s will is so 
fashioned, then she reveals her self in it; she regards it wholeheartedly (McKenna 2009: 5).  
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conscious (social) self-knowledge of the Individual, i.e., reflective questioning of her values and 
motives.  The Source Incompatibilist Argument expresses this further challenge.   
5.4 Responding to the Source Incompatibilist Argument 
Premise 1 of the CIA implies that free will requires the ability to choose among alternative 
courses of action—what is often called “regulative control” in the free will literature.  Since on 
both Nietzsche’s and Frankfurt’s account an agent can act of her own free will without choosing 
among alternative courses of action, neither is relying on “regulative control” as the basis for free 
will: they are relying on “guidance control”—arguing in effect that the agent’s action reflects her 
true self, even though she could not have done otherwise.  According to McKenna, anyone 
hoping to answer the incompatibilist by arguing that freedom does not require alternative 
possibilities must still address the Source Incompatibilist Argument’s requirement that the 
contribution that the agent makes to the production of her action must be significant enough to 
constitute acting on her own free will.   
The compatibilist must address the SOURCE INCOMPATIBILIST argument (SIA): 
1. A person acts of her own free will only if she is its [her own free will’s] ultimate 
source. 
2. If determinism is true, no one is the ultimate source of her actions. 
3. Therefore, if determinism is true, no one acts of her own free will. 
 
Since both Frankfurt and Nietzsche are defending compatibilist accounts of freedom, we must 
see each as challenging either premise 1 or premise 2 of the SIA.  On my reading, here is where 
Nietzsche and Frankfurt part company.   
According to McKenna, given the accepted definition of “ultimate,” no compatibilist can 
deny the truth of premise 2.  For this reason Frankfurt argues against premise 1 by arguing that 
an agent can be responsible for her action even if she is not its ultimate source (McKenna 2009: 
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28).  But a few participants in recent free will debates have argued against the second premise of 
the SIA by arguing that, even if determinism is true, it is possible to be the ultimate source of 
one’s action, on the grounds that the standard reading of “ultimate source” is too strong.  These 
philosophers offer an alternative reading of “ultimate” that is contextual—limited in scope—and 
that does not extend back into history indefinitely.  Stimulated by McKenna’s suggestion that 
“[p]erhaps there is some room for compatibilists to resist the second premise instead of the first 
by offering a positive account of being an ultimate source of one’s action” (McKenna 2009: 8) 
and by articles by McKenna (2009) and Clarke (2005) that argue against the incompatibilist 
reading of the ultimacy requirement, I defend a compatibilist reading of Nietzsche by seeing him 
as arguing against the second premise of the SIA.   
McKenna sees two ways to develop and defend a contextual sense of ultimacy: the first is 
communication-based, or social; the second is expressivist or narrative (McKenna 2008: 15).  
Nietzsche, of course, has much to say about the communication-based or social dimension of 
life.  As discussed earlier, conscious self-knowledge or self-image is something we acquire at an 
early age.  But the ability to navigate our communication-based or social environment is not an 
adequate basis for freedom for Nietzsche, since conscious self-knowledge (self-image) is 
available to all humans, including members of the herd.   
Nietzsche, I argue, takes on premise 2 by arguing that the person, who is both an 
Individual and takes responsibility for her actions, has become the “ultimate” source of her 
actions.  Nietzsche can be seen as embracing the second of the two alternatives for limiting the 
scope of “ultimacy” discussed by McKenna: the expressive or narrative approach.  On this 
approach, attributed to Fischer and Ravizza (1998), an agent takes responsibility for her self by 
seeing herself in a certain way, according to a story or narrative that makes sense of her life.  On 
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my reading of Nietzsche, the Individual engages in a similar activity when she “gives style to her 
character,” “surveying strengths and weaknesses, retaining desirable parts of our second nature, 
hiding undesirable parts of first nature…fitting all these into an artistic plan such that even our 
weaknesses fit in positively:  in the end it appears to be the work of a single taste” (GS 290).  
Nietzsche can still argue that the agent is the “ultimate” source of her actions because he limits 
the sense of “ultimate”:  it is not the “heaven and hell” sense of “ultimate” of Strawson.  With the 
scope of “ultimate” limited to life on this earth, one can be the ultimate source of one’s will.    
My reading of Nietzsche focuses on the role of reflective consciousness, and by taking a 
context-dependent definition of “ultimacy” and “ultimate source,” enables us to argue that the 
Nietzsche of his constructive philosophy is compatibilist.  There are two requirements for 
ascribing responsibility—a knowledge component and a willing component: we must be satisfied 
that the agent knew what she was doing and willed the action (wanted to do it).  In this regard, 
perhaps the key idea regarding sovereignty, the Individual, and self-understanding is that we can 
never have knowledge of our actions or of another’s actions, since we can’t get beyond our own 
perspectives.  But an Individual can attain self-knowledge (i.e. self-understanding) of her drives 
and feelings. The knowledge of an action needed to ascribe responsibility to an agent, either by 
the agent herself or by an observer or judge, is never available.  But self-understanding is 
possible, and this enables the Individual to take responsibility for her future and actions.  She is 
both an Individual and free.  
In Chapter 6, I reassess the significance of the Sovereign Individual. 
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6 A REASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOVEREIGN 
INDIVIDUAL 
Leiter offers two possible “deflationary” readings of the account of the SI in GM II.  The 
first is the “wholly ironic” reading.  On the second, “the ‘sovereign individual’ does indeed 
represent an ideal of the self, one marked by a kind of self-mastery foreign to less coherent 
selves (whose momentary impulses pull them this way and that), but such a self, and its self-
mastery is, in Nietzschean terms, a fortuitous natural artifact (a bit of ‘fate’), not an autonomous 
achievement for which anyone could be responsible” (Leiter 2011: 104).  Either reading, in 
Leiter’s opinion, enables us “to understand how and why Nietzsche, the fatalist and arch-skeptic 
about free will, would have created the figure of the ‘sovereign individual’” (Leiter 2011: 104).   
I have argued that, even if the achievement of the substantive ideal is “a bit of fate,” it 
plays a significant role in Nietzsche’s constructive philosophy as an illustration of the possible 
and achievable “fate” of the experimenters, those readers born with the drives of the investigator, 
the questioner, the skeptic.  The SI embodies the goal of what I see as Nietzsche’s constructive 
philosophy: (1) the SI is an Individual—her drives have organized into a unified hierarchy; and 
(2) the SI is reflectively conscious and sovereign over her drives in that she has developed non-
desire based motivation, and has taken responsibility for her “long will,” i.e., her drives’ ability 
to deliver on future promises.  The SI does embody the “substantive ideal” that Poellner first 
described as “[success in] integrating an unusually great multiplicity of ‘drives’ and evaluative 
commitments into a lasting, coherent whole” (Leiter 2011: 110).   
Katsafanas observes that “[a]lthough explicit discussions of the sovereign individual are 
confined to GM II 2, the entirety of GM II and GM III appeal to the capacities exemplified by 
this [sovereign] individual (Katsafanas 2014: 190).  It is not unreasonable to think that Nietzsche 
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would see the “substantive ideal,” as exemplified by the SI, playing a role in his vision of a 
constructive or practical philosophy based on experimenters responding to what Leiter calls the 
“Therapeutic Nietzsche.” 
It is indisputable that there is irony in GM II 2’s portrayal of the SI.  But the irony 
centered on promising is surely more complex than Leiter suggests.  This account of the 
development of the institution of promising is significant for the account of autonomy in 
Nietzsche because, following Searle’s discussion, promising is a classic example of “non-desire 
based motivation,” where “non-desire based motivation,” power over our own drives, is key to 
autonomy and necessary for power over others (Searle 2001: 198).  This account of promising 
sheds light on Nietzsche’s account of the SI and provides the basis for a reading of the SI 
passage that is not ironic, unless one reads it as doubly ironic.  As Katsafanas emphasizes, 
“promising” is not to be taken lightly.  The promisor must be strong enough to maintain her 
commitments in the face of temptations, and to refrain from acting upon her drives: “[t]he 
promisor has a capacity to will” (Katsafanas 2014: 191).   
There are textual reasons to put less emphasis on the ironic reading of the SI and more on 
the “substantial ideal.”  As Nietzsche suggests in his discussion of GM in EH, each of its three 
parts has its own rhetorical strategy.  “In each case, a beginning that should be deceptive: cool, 
scientific, even ironic, intentionally foreground, intentionally evasive” (EH ‘Books’ GM).  Once 
he has secured our emotional involvement, he launches into his intended message; in the case of 
GM II, that “conscience” is the result of cruelty turned inward.  The strongest example of irony 
in GM II 2 may well be the discussion of “conscience.”  I suggest that the “surprise,” with regard 
to “conscience,” is not its appearance as the italicized last word of GM II 2, but that the 
alternative “revaluation” of “conscience” in the last section of GM II (section 24)—where “good 
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conscience” is in alignment with (instead of opposition to) “first nature”—is all that is needed to 
change an ironic caricature into a replacement for the ascetic ideal.  The achievement of 
sovereignty is the “achievement” (through self-understanding of one’s drives and character) of 
the “revaluation of conscience”— throwing off the ascetic ideal and replacing it with the 
“substantive ideal” illustrated in GM II 2 as the Sovereign Individual.   
In this thesis I have attempted to show that Nietzsche does believe in freedom and 
responsibility, Nietzsche does think his target readers can exercise meaningful control over their 
lives, and Nietzsche does think that his revisionary sense of “‘freedom’—the ‘long protracted 
will’” (Leiter 2011: 27) is in reach of anyone, or at least of any of the readers he is hoping to 
reach.  This freedom is compatibilist, not the “freedom to do otherwise” or “causa sui” versions 
that are the target of his critical philosophy, and the “responsibility” is personal—taken by 
oneself for oneself, not social or moral or involving the ascription of praise or blame.  The 
control that is available to the experimenter is “guidance control,” the control that comes from 
acting from drives and perspectives that are one’s own, not based on values inherited from 
society.  But this control over our drives and ultimately, over how we are seen by others, is 
meaningful, in that it results in a reinterpretation of our drives and creation of new values—
replacing those provided by the ascetic ideal.  Last, this freedom is available to those in 
Nietzsche’s target audience who possess the right drives, since any of these “experimenters”44 
can succeed in becoming an Individual, and, if lucky, a Sovereign Individual.  What more can be 
expected of a constructive or practical philosophy? 
 
  
                                                 
44
 “We are experimenters: let us also want to be them!” (D 453) 
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